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ABSTRACT 
In 2008, Minneapolis resident Shirwa Ahmed became the first U.S. suicide bomber after 
he detonated his explosives-laden vehicle in front of a government compound in Hargesa, 
Somaliland.  Ahmed’s transformation from an average American teenager to an Islamic 
jihadist was gradual and complex.  This thesis will examine how Ahmed, and other 
Somali-Americans, morphed into Salafi jihadists.   
Through interviews with law enforcement, social services providers, and 
homeland security officials, the cultural, religious, and assimilative traits existing within 
this unique diaspora community that have affected the trajectory of the radicalization of 
its members will be examined.  Factors such as historic clan identity, religious 
pragmatism, pastoralism, and Somali-nationalistic identity generally discourage the 
adoption of transnational movements like global jihadism by first generation Somali 
émigrés.  An in-depth analysis of the profiles of Somali-American travelers suggests that 
Somali youth are less like their parents and are more similar to their American and 
European-Muslim counterparts.  Thus, they are a virtual “tabula rasa” upon which 
jihadist recruiters may not only write but also erase much of the youths’ inherent clannish 
identity and cultural traits.  These newly indoctrinated youths rush to embrace American 
culture but are torn between two diametrically opposed identities. The resulting tension 
leaves a gap ready to be filled by Salafi Islam. 
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In 1996, 14-year-old Shirwa Ahmed escaped the Kenyan refugee camp in which 
he, his mother, and three siblings had been living since fleeing their Somali homeland 
three years earlier (Meryhew, 2009).  Through one of the many U.S. charitable 
organizations supporting Somali refugees, the family obtained passage to the United 
States (Meryhew, 2009).  Originally placed in the Pacific Northwest, Ahmed’s family 
made their secondary migration to Minneapolis, Minnesota a year later in order to be 
closer to other family members (Meryhew, 2009).   
Despite being older than many Somali refugees arriving in the United States, 
Ahmed quickly embraced his new hostland.  At Roosevelt High School, his teachers 
described him as an “average student” with an affable nature who quickly grasped 
English and American culture (New York Times, 2009).  According to his friends, he 
was just one of the guys, wearing hip-hop fashions, playing pick-up basketball after 
school, and hanging out at the Mall of America on weekends (Meryhew, 2009).  In June 
2000, Ahmed graduated from Roosevelt and began attending college classes at a local 
community college (Meryhew, 2009).  During this time, Ahmed worked several jobs 
including pushing a wheelchair at Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport (Meryhew, 
2009).  
Up to this point, Ahmed’s life appeared both typical and promising, which is why 
Ahmed’s metamorphosis over the next eight years from average teenager to Islamic 
jihadist is so alarming.  This transformation culminated in the ending of Ahmed’s life 
Ahmed left the U.S. for training in Somalia, and on October 29, 2008, he slid behind the 
wheel of a Toyota Land Cruiser in Bossasso, a town in northern Somaliland.  Ahmed 
drove his vehicle through the streets until reaching the Puntland’s intelligence 
headquarters (Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, 2009).  Once there, Ahmed 
detonated the explosives in his Land Cruiser and ended his life at age 26 (Jane's 
Terrorism and Security Monitor, 2009).  Almost simultaneously with Ahmed’s death, 
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three other vehicles replicated his attack throughout the northern region of Somaliland.  
Once completed, the attacks claimed 28 souls and wounded 48 others (Jane's Terrorism 
and Security Monitor, 2009).   
The attacks served as a wake-up call for U.S. officials to the growth of political 
Islam in Somalia and the problem of jihadist recruitment within the U.S. Somali 
Diaspora.  Ahmed’s radicalization by the Somali based “al-Shabaab” (“the youth”) 
terrorist organization marked the development of a new “homegrown” terrorist threat to 
the U.S. homeland. While Ahmed’s attack occurred on distant soil in Somalia, the fear 
that a typical Somali-American youth could be radicalized in the U.S. and travel abroad 
to fight on behalf of jihadists is concerning.  Moreover, it begs the greater question of 
what happens when these battle-hardened jihadists return to the U.S. and put their 
terrorist training to use on U.S. soil.   
This thesis examines the Somali Diaspora within the United States and how the 
cultural, religious, and social characteristics of this unique émigré group may affect the 
radicalization process.  Using the unique Somali cultural context, this thesis will examine 
how young Somalis morph from well-adjusted American teenagers into jihadists.  
Chapter I of this thesis outlines the problem facing homeland security officials in 
countering this homegrown threat.  Chapter II explains the methodology used in 
researching this issue.  Chapter III reviews the existing literature in both radicalization 
and assimilation studies as it relates to the Somali diasporants and describes where 
current gaps exist that this work addresses.  Chapter IV describes the Somali historical, 
sociological, and religious landscape for the main argument of this thesis, demonstrating 
how a small, but significant, number of Somali diasporants radicalizes to join the global 
jihad.  Chapter V discusses the unique qualities of the Somali culture, as demonstrated by 
their relative homogeneity, prior rejection of political Islam, how the integration 
experiences, and evolution of the community upon arrival to the United States creates a 
“crisis of culture,” which renders the individual susceptible to radicalization.  The term 
“radicalize” will be used to define the journey made by these individuals as they proceed 
from relatively ordinary lives to a point where they decide to take up arms against the 
“enemies of Islam.”  Chapter VI examines the open source information on the lives of the 
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Somali-Americans who left the U.S. to join the al-Shabaab terrorist network between 
2007 and 2008 and attempts to determine the inextricable linkages among the 
radicalization experiences.  Chapter VII will evaluate the radicalization process and 
examines how it applies to Somali-American “travelers” to determine the differences 
between the radicalization process of the Somali diasporants and their U.S./European 
counterparts.  Chapter VIII will then provide recommendations regarding the tailoring of 
outreach to this unique diaspora community.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In March 2008, the U.S. State Department designated the Somali based al-
Shabaab as a terrorist organization.  This designated was based in large part upon the 
group’s admitted ties to the al Qaeda terrorist network (U.S. Department of State, 2008).  
Interestingly, one year later the group’s leadership confirmed this relationship when it 
pledged bayat (oath of loyalty) to al-Qaeda (AQ) leader Osama bin Laden (Roggio, 
2009).  According to the Mukhtar Robow, a top military commander of al-Shabaab: 
[w]e will take our orders from Sheik Osama bin Laden because we are his 
students.  Al-Qaeda is the mother of the holy war in Somalia. Most of our 
leaders were trained in Al-Qaeda camps.  We get our tactics and 
guidelines from them.  (Sanders, 2008)   
As Al-Shabaab has emerged as a radical force in Somalia, so too has the group’s 
recruiting refined itself in the targeting of western Somali Diaspora communities, 
including those in the United States, Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands (Kohlman, 
2009).  In September 2008, the East Africa Al-Qaeda leader Saleh Nabhan began 
disseminating recruitment messages via the Internet to western diaspora communities 
stating, “[h]ere are training camps in Somalia . . .that have opened their doors so that you 
join them.  So be truthful with Allah and answer the call of jihad and prefer the lasting 
over the perishing and the next life over the present life” (Grace, 2008).   
 4
Other recruitment efforts have included polished Internet video clips, which are 
set to rap music and feature the English speaking Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki,1 also known 
as “the American,” and his exploits.  These videos of Al-Amriki include him leading a 
group of Al-Shabaab members in a raid against Ethiopian troops. These recruitment 
efforts clearly target young Western audiences (Patterson, 2009).  At the same time the 
Internet and other media tools are being utilized by Al-Shabaab, the group’s use of one-
on-one recruitment has been widespread in diaspora communities.  This has included the 
more reclusive small group settings using basements, mosques, community centers, and 
sporting activities (Forliti, 2009). 
The efficacy of the Al-Shabaab recruitment efforts is shown by its ability to lure 
young American Muslims to Somalia to fight in the on-going war, including the January 
2007 capture of two American citizens fleeing Somalia after Ethiopian troops regained 
control of previously held Al-Shabaab territory and the case of Abu Mansoor al-Amriki 
discussed above (Patterson, 2009, p. 3). This problem, however, took on greater 
prevalence when, in 2008, recruiters facilitated the travel of approximately 20 American-
Somali youths to Somalia from Minneapolis/St. Paul diaspora (Patterson, 2009, p. 3).  
Law enforcement has speculated that the 20 “travelers” left the United States in 
order to train and fight in Somalia’s on-going civil war or to train for terrorist operations, 
such as suicide bomber Shirwa Ahmed’s attack, discussed previously (Liepman, 2009).  
As the links between these Somali groups and Al-Qaeda grows, law enforcement remains 
concerned that through the influence of Al-Qaeda, the now regional conflict within 
Somalia will grow into an international one. Patterson (2008), a New York Police 
Department Analyst, states, “[w]hile AMISOM forces and rival tribal groups may be the 
first target of future Al-Shabab operations, it should come as no surprise if and when 
those sights are shifted at United States interests either at home or abroad”  (p. 3). 
However, while it is clear that U.S. Somali Diaspora is being targeted for 
recruitment by Al-Qaeda and other Islamists organizations, little is actually known about 
                                                 
1 Abu Mansoor’s actual identity remained unknown until September 2009, when he was identified as 
Omar Hammami, a 25-year old native of Mobile, Alabama.  Hammami, prior to travelling to Somalia, was 
a sophomore at University of South Alabama where he was the president of the Muslim Student 
Association. 
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the Somali-American community, its potential for radicalization, and what steps, if any, 
can be taken to better inoculate community members from radical Islamists messages 
(Evan, 2008).  As will be discussed in this thesis, the Somali Diaspora in America is “one 
of the most unique sets of newcomers to ever enter this nation” (Population Association 
of America [PAA], 2006).  The Somali Diaspora’s war-torn homeland, their experience 
as refugees, their Sufi-Sunni Islamic practice and a persistent tribal-clan culture sets this 
group apart from other Muslim émigré populations arriving in the U.S. and creates a 
complex problem for homeland security officials in tailoring outreach.   
Although the Somali Diaspora is often “poor, marginalized and disenfranchised” 
and “appear ripe to recruit for participation in terrorist organizations” (Menkhaus, 2009, 
p. 35), they historically have been a “surprisingly poor source of recruitment into al 
Qa’aida” (Menkhaus, 2009, p. 35).  Despite this, however, generational gaps and growing 
crisis of identity within the community may increase the receptiveness of community 
members for the jihadist message, as seen in the 2007–2008 disappearances of 
approximately 20 Somali-Americans from the Twin Cities (Ahmed, 2009).   
As a result, there is a need for policy makers and law enforcement to better 
understand this community, its unique characteristics, and what factors may explain, not 
only why these communities have historically shunned jihadism, but also why recent 
events indicate that second and third generations may be more susceptible to the Jihadist 
call to arms.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Do the culture and integrative patterns of a Muslim Diaspora community into the 
West effect the radicalization of individuals within that community? 
What changes in the Somali-American community are occurring that has made 
second and third generations susceptible to radicalization (as evidenced by the recent 
disappearance of an unknown number of youths from the Minneapolis, Minnesota 
community)? 
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How can outreach to this community be tailored to better facilitate cooperation 
with respect to jihadist recruitment, taking into account the unique social, economic, and 
cultural aspects of this community? 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
The research for this thesis is broken down into two parts: first, is a study of the 
two largest existing Somali Diaspora communities in the U.S. the Columbus, Ohio and 
Minneapolis/St. Paul communities; and second, is to develop a profile of the Somali 
youths who have been recruited by jihadist groups.  Due to the fact that many of these 
individuals are deceased, incarcerated, or still missing, much of the background data was 
taken from journalist interviews of friends, families, and teachers of the missing Somali-
Americans.  Once a profile is developed, it was then compared against other jihadist 
recruits in the United States and the United Kingdom Muslim communities.  The 
differences and similarities was then identified and compared with the integrative profile 
of the Somali communities to determine if any of these cultural and integrative factors 
may play a role in either discouraging or encouraging radicalization.   
Several interviews were conducted for this thesis with individuals working in the 
Somali community in the St. Paul/Minneapolis region and Columbus, Ohio.  These two 
areas were chosen due to the fact that they have the largest Somali populations in the 
United States.  
The author interviewed individuals with a diverse range of experience ranging 
from public safety, such as firefighters servicing the community, immigration/social 
services employees, and law enforcement/intelligence officers.  Each interview was 
conducted either face-to-face or over the telephone.  The interviewees’ identities will 
remain anonymous and only a general title would be given, such as law enforcement 
officer-Ohio (OLE1).   
Although it is acknowledged that by withholding the identities of the individuals, 
the reader will be unable to assess the credibility and/or knowledge base of each 
interviewee, concealing their identities was a necessary step for two reasons.  First, 
identifying the individuals by name could unnecessarily jeopardize or harm their 
relationship with the community that they service.  Second, in at least one case, the 
interview simply would not have occurred had the individual been required to gain 
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permission from their supervisor, which would have been the case had the individual 
been identified by name.  The interviews focused primarily on the individuals experience 
within the community and their experience in providing social and public safety services 
to the community.   
A. COLUMBUS, OHIO 
In the Columbus, Ohio community, the author interviewed three individuals 
within the community.   
1. The first interviewee was a state level law enforcement officer who works 
directly within the Somali community in Columbus, Ohio.  He will be 
hereafter referred to as OLE1.   
2. A second interview was conducted with a senior manager of a state social 
services agency who oversees contracts and programs aiding refugees in 
the Somali community, identified as OSS1.     
3. The third interview is an academic residing in Ohio who currently 
provides consulting services to several federal, state, and local law 
enforcement organizations in regards to the Somali community and 
Muslim culture, identified as OSP1.   
The research in the Columbus community was limited to the above individuals 
and supplemented by state and federal reports, studies of the communities, and other 
open source information. 
B. THE TWIN CITIES—MINNEAPOLIS, ST.PAUL, MINNESOTA 
As with the Columbus community, the research was limited to semi-structured 
interviews of officials having close contact with the communities.   
1. The first individual interviewed was a law enforcement officer working in 
the Twin Cities community.  He will be identified as MLE1.  As with 
OLE1, this interviewee provided information on the Somali community’s 
relationship with law enforcement, views of police, what the primary 
obstacles of effective government outreach are from his point of view, and 
what crime and youth problems are present within the community.  
Notably, significant similarities were observed by both the Columbus law 
enforcement officer and the Minneapolis law enforcement officers with 
respect to their impressions and experiences.   
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2. The second individual interviewed was an emergency services (EMS) 
professional, servicing the Minneapolis area.  This individual’s area of 
responsibility was a large Somali community in the area, and he has had 
extensive experience in servicing the needs of the community. He is 
identified as MFS1.   
Although originally intended, the author was unable to secure interviews from 
either the DHS Office of Civil Rights and Liberties or a member of the federal law 
enforcement community in Minneapolis.  Despite several attempts, the interviewees in 
each case were unable to secure approval from their supervisors to be interviewed 
regarding the subject matter.  Some unclassified information was provided by the sources 
in the form of documents, but no statements regarding federal outreach will be attributed 
to any federal official.   
Once the interviews were complete, the information has been used to develop a 
“Somali context” or group of characteristics, history, and cultural traits that may affect 
the radicalization process.  Then, using existing interviews with journalists and varying 
testimony from family members, friends, and teachers, profiles were prepared of three 
Somali youths who left their communities in the U.S. to fight in Somalia.  Then these 
profiles were compared against existing studies of other non-Somali homegrown terrorist 
groups in Europe and the United States to determine if their trajectory is different based 
upon the Somali culture and context.  Factors that were compared include socio-
economic status, integration status, racial/ethnic/religious conflict between the diaspora 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature reviewed can be broken down into two categories.  The first group 
studies the process of Islamic radicalization and the second examines the Somali-
American Diaspora from a sociological perspective.  What is notable in this existing 
literature is not what literature exists, but rather what literature is absent from the field.  
Specifically, there appears to be no research that specifically addresses the radicalization 
path of the Somali-American Diaspora.  Also absent is research addressing whether the 
Somali-Diaspora has a distinct radicalization pattern that would explain why young 
Somali-Americans, such as Shirwa Ahmed, discussed in the introduction, who have 
generally not been attracted to radical Islam, have recently become more receptive to 
these recruitment efforts.      
A. RADICALIZATION RESEARCH  
With respect to the radicalization process in general, the research is extensive.  
However, despite common themes in the literature, there are also marked differences in 
how authors view the subject of radicalization.  At the core of these differences appears 
to be what role religious ideology plays in the radicalization process.  For some authors, 
discussed below, radical Islam and religious ideology are central to the radicalization 
process.  Conversely, others contend that while Islam is an important part of the terrorist 
narrative, it is only the justification or “veneer” for the socially deviant and violent 
behaviors at the core of terrorism.    
Falling in the latter category, with his two books Understanding Terror Networks 
(2004b) and Leaderless Jihad (2004a), Marc Sageman argues that focusing on religious 
ideology in terrorism is largely a mistake.  Sageman contends that terrorists are 
predominantly driven by social bonds, and that “cliques” should be considered greater 
motivators than any firmly held understanding of global Salafi jihad (2004, p. 154). 




disenfranchised (2004). He claims that 75 percent of the terrorists he studied were 
married, had no criminal history, were middle class, and had modern educations (2004, p. 
154).    
Supporting Sageman’s view is Olivier Roy in his book Al Qaeda in the West as 
Youth Movement: The Power of a Narrative (2008).  Roy contends that while humiliation 
among Muslims is often cited as a motivator, there is a “radical discrepancy between the 
map of the actual conflicts in the Middle East and the map of recruitment” (2008, p. 7).  
Roy asserts that in Europe, Al-Qaeda should be understood as a youth movement that 
shares many factors with other forms of youth dissent or rebellion (2008, p. 6).  Roy 
further attempts to explain suicide terrorism (the “archetype of radical Islam”) in terms of 
the “Columbine syndrome,” i.e., the targeting of a group of known individuals and then 
committing suicide in order to achieve importance and relevance (2008, p. 6).    
Adopting the view that religious ideology does play a central role in radicalization 
is the New York City Police Department study and Dutch Intelligence (AIVD) study.  
The AIVD study, entitled Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands: From Incident to 
Trend (2002), examines how the Netherland’s Moroccan-Muslim population has 
radicalized in recent years.  The AIVD study found that many of the recruits of radical 
Islam are young, second generation immigrants who are dissatisfied with their 
assimilation into Dutch society, unemployment, perceived discrimination and a feeling of 
“relative deprivation” (2002).  Also, many of these individuals, according to AIVD, feel 
unsatisfied with the level or manner of religious practice by their parent, which makes 
Salafi Islam all the more appealing.  The introduction to radical Islam provides young 
Moroccan men with a purpose, a feeling of empowerment to effectuate change in their 
environment as well as a needed social network against the discrimination by the larger 
Dutch community.     
The Intelligence Division of the New York Police Department in its study, 
Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, also focuses on the importance of 
Salafi Islam (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).  The NYPD report identified four phases of 
radicalization using profiles of terrorists such as the 7/7 London Bombers, the Madrid  
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Train Bombers, and the 9/11 terrorists. This study focuses almost exclusively on the 
individuals’ identification with and adoption of the Salafi-Jihadist ideology (Silber & 
Bhatt, 2007, p. 30). 
Other studies such at Tomas Precht’s study, Home Grown Terrorism and Islamist 
Radicalization in Europe, builds off of the NYPD study (2007, p. 30).  Precht focuses on 
three broad sets of causes: background factors, trigger factors, and opportunity factors 
(2007, pp. 50, 56).  Interestingly, Precht focuses on identifying the “trigger” factors that 
push the individual from his pre-radicalization phase to a full-blown extremist 
hermeneutic.  These include events such as western foreign policies and actions, a 
provocative event, the presence of a charismatic leader and the glorification of jihad 
(2007, p. 56).   
Other studies of terrorists in the United Kingdom and the U.S. are crossovers of 
the many works listed above but also have distinguishing factors that were considered in 
determining how an individual becomes radicalized.  Similarly, a study by Gartenstein-
Ross and Grossman, entitled Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K., laid out six 
manifestations of the radicalization process that were observed in homegrown terrorists 
(2009).  Three of the manifestations were internal to the individual, including: adopting 
an all-encompassing legalistic interpretation of Islam; trusting only select religious 
authorities; perceiving an “inherent schism” between Islam and the West and western 
ideas, such as participation in democratic processes (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 
2009, p. 40).  The remaining three are observable and include low or no tolerance for 
competing interpretations of Islam (p. 48); attempts to impose religious ideas on others 
(p. 50); and a radicalization in political thought by the individual including a belief that 
the West is conspiring against Islam and that the Muslim people must be rescued 
(Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman).   
In summary, there are areas where researchers have found common ground on the 
issue of radicalization.  Particularly, most researchers agree that one essential element of 




importance of this belief is disputed, some researchers believe this is a driving belief 
while others believe it is used as a persuasive narrative, all appear to agree that it is a 
present component.     
In addition, the importance of factors such as assimilation, economics, and 
educational opportunities vary among researchers. Some researchers, such as Sageman, 
claim that terrorists tend to be better educated, affluent individuals while other 
researchers clearly take the position that the poor and disenfranchised are the ripe recruits 
for terrorist organizations and can often be driven to terrorism by their status.   
With respect to the Islamists in Somalia, literature exists that outlines the 
emergence and development of political Islam in Somalia.  Kenneth Menkhaus, a 
professor at Davidson College, has produced several pieces on the history of Islamism in 
Somalia and how Islamism has frequently been obstructed by the Somali culture (2002).  
The Center for Countering Terrorism, a U.S. Army West Point center, has produced a 
study of Al-Qaeda in Africa as well, although an almost complete lack of footnotes or 
reference citations make much of the work difficult to critique.   
B. SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE 
While extensive works exists regarding diasporas in general, there still exists 
some gaps in researching the U.S. Somali Diaspora, in particular, the nature of these 
communities integration into their host country.  While works such as Theorizing 
Diaspora: A Reader, provide an baseline review of immigration and assimilation in 
general terms (Braziel, 2000), it is not intended to focus on each groups individual 
assimilation issues.      
With respect to Somali Diasporants, a recent study conducted by the United 
Nations Development Program attempts to track where Somalis who have fled Somalia 
actually live.  Aside from outlining general population numbers of various Somali 
Diaspora communities, the study further attempts to characterize how the various waves 
of Somali émigrés integrate differently to their host country and relate back to their 
homeland (United Nations Development Project, 2009).   
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Other studies, such as the Putnam and Noor (1999) study, attempt to study the 
Somali-American Diaspora and what factors have affected the immigration and 
assimilation of this group, including factors such as religion and skin color.  The Putnam 
and Noor study point to the multiple obstacles for Somali Diasporas in America.  
Namely, the fact that the larger U.S. society may view the Somali immigrants as simply 
part of the “black” community; however, the African-American community does not 
view them that way.  Furthermore, the Somali community does not view itself as black 
either but rather as a separate community.  Nevertheless, the relevance of this work 
suffers significantly due to its age and pre-9/11 lens. 
Other studies focus on how American-Somali communities interact with their 
non-Somali neighbors.  One study of interest is Somali Immigrant Settlement in Small 
Midwestern U.S. Communities, produced by the University of Wisconsin; it studies the 
integration of Somali immigrants into a rural suburb of Minneapolis-St. Paul (Grossman, 
2007).  The author observed factors that first led to the migration of the Somali-American 
community away from larger metropolitan areas to more rural communities and then 
examines how the group interacts with the new host populations and the process of 
assimilation. 
A study that combines both a criminology and sociology approach to its research 
was conducted by city of Minneapolis’s Office of Civil Liberties regarding Somali youth 
issues (Adan, 2006).  This study reviews current issues in education, assimilation, crime, 
and unemployment, which affect the Somali community and, in particular, younger 
Somali-Americans (Adan).  This study is particularly effective in describing assimilation 
barriers based upon education, language proficiency, and cultural reluctance to 
“Americanize”.   
An interesting study conducted by the Cedar Riverside Neighborhood 
Revitalization Program (CRNRP) and the Somali American Education Program (SAEP), 
looks at how to better engage the Somali youth community in Minneapolis’s Cedar 
Riverside neighborhood (Kasper, Fleck, & Gardner, 2009).  The study conducts multiple 
interviews of community activists, social workers, and also Somali youth.  Unfortunately, 
the study, by its own admission was unable to secure interviews from actual Somali 
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youth living in the Cedar Riverside neighborhood, which arguably undermines the 
findings (Kasper et al.).  Instead, Somali students from other neighborhoods are 
interviewed about the Cedar Riverside community. While these students spend time in 
the Cedar-Riverside neighborhood, they ultimately have the opportunity to leave it, 
which may provide a different perspective on the state of the community. 
In summing up the sociological literature, some key themes emerge.  First, there 
appears to be a consensus that the Somali-American community has to date not achieved 
the level of assimilation that many of their Muslim counterparts have.  As most studies 
have pointed out, barriers such as language, education, race, and economic status have 
relegated many members of this community to poverty and minimum wage employment.  
As pointed out by the city of Minneapolis study, these barriers have led to a rise in crime 
and gang membership among the members of this population. 
In summing up the two groups of research, sociology, and radicalization literature 
are extensive.  The sociological data regarding Somalis and how Muslim Diasporas 
integrate into western societies appears to be comprehensive.  Equally, with respect to 
radicalization, the literature regarding how individuals progress from typical young adult 
to terrorist is extensive and appears only limited by the number of terrorists who’s data is 
available.  However, where a gap exists in current research is in the analysis between 
how Somali culture may affect this radicalization process.   
As Sageman found in his study in Leaderless Jihad, Pakistani youth in the U.K. 
are drawn to jihadism because they are torn between two worlds (homeland and hostland) 
neither of which fully accepts the individual (Sageman, 2003).  This lack of acceptance 
renders certain youth susceptible to radicalization as they attempt to find identity in the 
alternate identity of jihadism.  A useful line of inquiry with respect to youth in the Somali 
Diaspora becomes whether Somali youth who come to the United States are like those 
Pakistanis in Europe, who are trapped between cultures, or whether their integration, or 
failure, to integrate alters the radicalization path.   
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IV. THE SOMALI “CONTEXT” 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The uniqueness of the Somali community, both in Somalia and in the diaspora, 
stems from what can be referred to as the Somali “context” (Counter Terrorism Center, 
United States Military Academy (CTC-USMA), 2006, p. 29).  This “context” can be 
loosely defined as the culminated characteristics of the Somali people including their 
history, religious practices, social structure (in particular clannism and pastoralism), and 
their global diaspora and its integrative characteristics.   
This “cocktail” of factors affects how Somalis integrate into their hostland, how 
governments are viewed, and how the transnational message of jihadism is received and 
evaluated.  While this context has historically inhibited the rise of jihadist Islam (CTC-
USMA, 2006, p. 29) and has made Somalia a “surprisingly poor source” for recruitment 
to violent jihadist movements (Menkhaus, 2008, p. 39), there are indications that 
modernity may be undermining these inhibitors with the progression of time.  This 
chapter will examine these factors in order to provide a context when viewing Somali 
radicalization in later chapters.  
B. HISTORY OF SOMALIA AND THE US DIASPORA 
As a uniquely American idiom, the phrase “that’s ancient history” refers to an 
“event . . . that occurred in the remote past and has no practical relationship with the 
present” (Dictionary.com, 2009).  In the colloquial use of this phrase, Americans refer to 
events that occurred a few years, a few months, or even a few weeks ago.  While this 
view of history and its relevance to modernity is generally shared and understood by most 
Americans, this is a concept not shared by many in the Muslim world (Lewis B., 2008).  
In contrast to the American view,  the Muslim world’s relationship with “ancient history” 
and modern history alike is one in which there is a practical relationship to the present.  
In this way, history provides the hermeneutic in which modern events, its actors, and 
motives are interpreted.   
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No place is this view of history more prevalent than in the interpretation of 
current events by jihadists.  For example, on October 7, 2001, Osama Bin Laden justified 
the attacks on the U.S. because of “the on-going humiliation and disgrace” felt by the 
Muslim people for “more than eighty years” at the hands of the West  (Lewis B., 2008).  
While many Western observers searched for meaning in this, much of the history 
conscious Muslim world immediately understood this obscure reference (Lewis B., 
2008).  The reference was to the fall of the Ottoman sultnate in 1918, which marked the 
end of the last recognized caliph, the head of all Sunni Islam, and “the last in a line of 
such rulers that dated back to the death of the Prophet Mohammed in 632 A.D.” (Lewis 
B., 2008, p. 3).   
Somalia is no different from the rest of the Muslim world in its relationship to 
history.  The past serves as a lens through which world events may be viewed and the 
actors in those events can be assigned motives and intentions not otherwise stated (Lewis 
B., 2008).  As Somali culture and history is communicated orally rather than written, this 
history takes on a prevalence, which may not exist in other cultures.  In this oral culture, 
it is the responsibility of parents to pass along history first hand to their children, who 
will absorb the history of not only Somalia but also their individual family’s place in that 
history.  As a result, it is common through rote memorization that Somali children learn 
the name of every male lineage in their line of descent, which allows forefathers to 
“remain in the consciousness” of their offspring (Issa-Salwe & Olden, 2008).  Likewise, 
for those Somalis driven into exile by war, the original cause of the displacement is 
remembered and passed on to the next generation as well as any associated grudges 
against the parties deemed to be responsible for the displacement (Volkan, 1997).  
1. History of Somalia 
Located in the horn of Africa, adjacent to the Arabian Peninsula, Somalia is a land 
that has been influenced by both Arab and European powers.  Prior to the rise of the 
Prophet Mohammed, Arab, Persian, and Chinese merchants travelled extensively through 
northern Somalia and its coastal lands trading with indigenous populations in 
frankincense and myrrh, which the region continues to export (Putnam, 1993).  As early 
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as seventh-century A.D., the indigenous Cushitic (ancestors of current Somalis) 
interaction with Arab and Persian traders lead to the introduction of Islam and the 
proliferation of the Arabic language within the region (Bureau of African Affairs, 2009).   
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Somalia and its people 
felt the full effects of European colonialism.  During this time, Somalia was divided into 
five areas based upon colonial occupation by both far and near powers.  The five areas 
were British ruled northern Somaliland; northern Italian Somaliland; French Somaliland 
(now independent Dijbouti); Western Somalia (the Ogaden region), controlled by 
Ethiopia; and the Northern Frontier District, controlled by Kenya (Samatar 2007).  The 
Republic of Somalia’s five-point star on its national flag serves as a reminder of these 
five regions and its colonial past (Samatar A., 2007). 
During the first two decades of the twentieth-century, British rule was frequently 
challenged by several Somali nationalist groups.  The most notable among them was 
dervish rebellion led by Mohamed Abdullah, known as the “Mad Mullah” by British 
soldiers (Bureau of African Affairs, 2009).  Abdullah and his insurgency was ultimately 
quashed by British forces in 1920; however, Abdullah remains a prominent figure in 
Somali national identity (Bureau of African Affairs, 2009).   
After World War II, as part of the Axis surrender, Italy relinquished control of 
Italian Somaliland.  In accordance with this peace treaty, the United Nations was given 
the responsibility of disposing of all former Italian colonies, and, in 1949, the UN placed 
Italian Somaliland in trusteeship for 10 years, ultimately granting Somali independence in 
1960 (Bureau of African Affairs, 2009).  With independence on July 1, 1960, the British 
and Italian sections of Somalia were merged to form the Somali Republic.  For nine years 
from 1960–1969, Somalia was the most democratic nation on the African continent, with 
several peaceful transitions of power and a widespread support of the democratic 
constitution adopted in 1961 (Samatar A., 2008).   
Although a democratic government was in place during this time, from its outset 
Somalia suffered from its colonial heritage and tribal culture.  At one point during the 
1960s period, “political parties proliferated to the point where Somalia had more parties 
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per capita than any other democratic country except Israel” (Samatar D., 1987, p. 69).  
This chaos in the electoral process and the rise of pan-Somali nationalism, which sought 
to unite French Somaliland and the Somali populated portion of Kenya and Ethiopia, 
proved too much for the fledgling democracy (Bureau of African Affairs, 2009).  This 
unrest came to a head with Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal’s (1967–1969) 
renouncement of Somalia’s claim to both the Kenyan and Ethiopian portions of Somalia 
(Bureau of African Affairs, 2009).  This action, while providing much needed peace with 
Somali’s neighbors, angered much of the country including the military.  This anger and 
damage to national pride ultimately manifested itself in a military coup against Egal in 
October 1969 by Major-General Mohammed Siyaad Barre (Bureau of African Affairs, 
2009).    
Barre’s takeover marked the end of the constitutional democracy in Somalia.  In 
its place, Barre formed a 20-member Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), placing 
himself at its head.  From its inception, Barre pursued a philosophy of “scientific 
socialism” that relied upon and borrowed heavily from the Soviet Union espousing the 
official mantra of “socialism unites, kinship divides” (Issa-Salwe & Olden, 2008, p. 572; 
Lewis I., 1998).  Barre’s rule was characterized by a marked reduction in political 
freedoms through the application of an aggressive national security service whose efforts 
were turned mainly towards Barre’s political enemies (Bureau of African Affairs, 2009).  
As part of his socialist theme and often for his own political benefit, Barre began the 
redistribution of property by use of military force throughout Somalia (Bureau of African 
Affairs, 2009).  
As Barre’s predecessor was ousted in part because of his relinquishment of 
Ogaden terrorist to Ethiopian, the Barre government undertook to reclaim this region by 
force.  From 1977 to 1978, Somalia engaged in the bloody but ultimately unsuccessful 
Ogaden war against its western neighbor Ethiopia.  In a shift of allegiances that is 
indicative of the complexity of the region, at one point in the war the Soviet Union was 
backing both Ethiopia and Somalia in the war.  Eventually, the Soviet Union would shift 
support from Somalia to Ethiopia exclusively, forcing the United States to shift their 
support to Somalia.  Ultimately, Somali forces were driven back by Ethiopia in a 
 21
humiliating defeat.  This defeat served to embolden several opposition movements 
against Barre’s government and ultimately lead to the demise of the regime. 
After the Ethiopian defeat, the Barre government abandoned its socialist 
philosophy as it embraced the United States as its patron.  This relationship included 
financial and military aid from the United Sates, including aid in repelling Ethiopian 
forces who attempted to invade Somalia in 1982.  Having found a reliable patron state for 
support, Barre turned his attention inward to the internal unrest that had been growing 
since Somalia’s defeat in the Ogaden War (Bureau of African Affairs, 2009).  Barre 
unleashed his security forces and military on the populace in order to silence a growing 
and vocal opposition party within the country.  One of the more vivid examples of these 
strong-arm tactics is Barre’s quelling of unrest in the city of Hargesa.  In that action, 
through the indiscriminate use of artillery, the Barre government leveled the town forcing 
300,000 Somalis from their homes (or approximately 4 percent of the overall population 
of the nation) (Menkhaus, 2002).  To give a better sense of the proportion of the 
destruction, forcing 4 percent of a population out of its area of resident would be the 
equivalent of displacing the greater New York metropolitan area.    
However, these repressive tactics only fostered greater opposition to Barre’s 
government, which by 1988 resulted in a full-scale civil war in the country.  On January 
27, 1991, forces from the United Somali Congress (USC) of the Hawiye clan, acting 
under an alliance with from opposition groups in the Ogadeen sub-clan and Isaaq clan, 
overthrew the Barre government (Bureau of African Affairs, 2009).     
After the fall of the government, various factions engaged in a protracted struggle 
for control of the country.  Clan-based competition and violence between heavily armed 
warlords marked this period as each group attempted to gain control of the country 
(Kohlman, 2009).  Initially, one faction of the USC attempted to unilaterally form an 
interim government.  This unilateral action was rejected by other factions, which 
ultimately led to the northern half of Somalia declaring its independence and forming the 
Somaliland Republic.  The USC’s attempted government was subsequently split into two 
different warring factions.  The most notable faction was lead by the commander of the 
USC military wing, General Mohammed Fara Aideed, who would gain prominence in his 
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later role as a warlord.  This struggle for control soon devolved from opposition parties 
fighting each other to powerful warlords struggling to gain advantage over competing 
factions.  At the same time that clan violence was at its height, political Islam began its 
slow growth in the region.  Similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan, Islamists in Somalia 
during the post-Barre period gained strength by promising to end the reign of the warlord 
and establish law and order within the country (Kohlman, 2009).   
In 1991 alone, it is estimated that several hundred thousand Somalis died as a 
result of the conflict (Samatar A., 2008).  In response to the widespread humanitarian 
crisis in the country, in August 1992, the international community authorized the United 
Nations Operation in Somali, or UNOSOM I, in an effort alleviate the growing crisis 
(Carson, 2009).  The United States began Operation Provide Relief, which entailed the 
deployment of a meager fifty peacekeeping troops to the region (Samatar A., 2008).  This 
action was intended to protect and stabilize the country enough that relief supplies could 
begin to make their way safely into the country.  It is estimated that at this point Somalia 
was suffering a national attrition rate of five-hundred thousand deaths a year due to 
famine and the ongoing violence (Samatar A., 2008).   
According to A. Samatar, Operation Provide Relief initially proved successful in 
getting food to the hungry in Somalia and protecting the relief convoys in the area (2008).  
The small force however was ineffective in quelling the violence or establishing lasting 
order in the country.  As a result, in 1992, the United Nations, led by the United States, 
implemented Operation Restore Hope, (UNOSOM II), which was intended to capture the 
Somali warlords who were escalating the civil war (Samatar A., 2008). 
As a note, it was after U.S. intervention during Operation Restore Hope that Al-
Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) founder Shaykh Hassan Aweys made contact with al-Qaida’s 
military wing, headed up by Abu Hafs al-Masri (Gettleman, 2009a).  After this contact, 
al-Qaeda sent four instructors to Somalia to train AIAI soldiers in “advanced combat 
tactics and weapons” (USMA-CTC, 2006).  According to al-Qaeda during this time, 




Somalia (Kohlman, 2009).  However, in spite of this claim, the extent of the actual role 
played by AQ operatives during the American intervention remains unclear (Kohlman, 
2009).     
The UNOSOM II operation is significant in part because of the October 1993 
Battle of Mogadishu in which two U.S. Blackhawk helicopters were brought down by 
militants using rocket propelled grenades (Bowden, 1998).  The ensuing battle killed 18 
U.S. soldiers and wounded 73 others (Bowden, 1998).  The estimates of Somali deaths 
from the battle range from 300 to 1500, with an unknown number of wounded (Bowden, 
1998).  From a Somali/U.S. relations standpoint, this battle marked a turning point in 
U.S. public opinion, particularly after the viewing of the horrific pictures of Somalis 
dragging U.S. service members’ corpses through the streets after the battle.  It also 
marked the beginning of the American withdrawal from the country a year later and the 
ultimate withdrawal of the majority of the international community (Carson, 2009).  
Eight years later, and in a post 9/11 world, Philadelphia Inquirer reporter Mark 
Bowden’s book Blackhawk Down was released as a feature film in the United States 
(Bowden, 1998).  While the significance of this movie and its timing can be disputed, it 
did offer a negative representation of Somalia and the Somali people.  Undoubtedly, the 
“good versus evil” framework that the movie puts the Somalis in has had some effect in 
forming the negative perception that average Americans has with this population.    
While the effects of the Battle of Mogadishu on U.S./Somali relations is unclear, 
the battle’s use for jihadist lore is clear.  For jihadist the battle serves as one of the 
cornerstones of what Kohlman calls the “founding myths” of Al-Qaeda’s methodology 
(p. 6),  namely, that the elite of America’s military could be trapped and beaten by a 
lightly armed group of jihadists and that, once beaten, the U.S. would flee (Kohlman, 
2009).  Al-Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden, frequently cites to this battle as proof that 
America is a “paper tiger” (Laden, 1998).    
Since the intervention of U.S. and United Nations in the early 1990s, little 
stability has been achieved in Somalia.  Warlords and clan militias have effectively 
thwarted numerous attempts by various entities to establish a central government in the 
country.  While pockets of stability have emerged, in particular the region of Somaliland 
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in the north of Somalia, which declared its independence and has subsequently 
established a relatively cohesive government, for the most part the country remained 
relatively lawless.  During this time, many local systems of government arose using clan-
based sharia courts, which provide improved law and order in the community 
(Menkhaus, 2009).  Islamic charities also play a vital role in providing essential service to 
these communities.  These charities, often funded by Gulf States, earned what Menkhaus 
describes as “performance legitimacy” among the Somali people and, in large part, are 
probably responsible for the growth of political Islam in this traditional apolitical Sufi 
state (2009).      
In 2006, a loose coalition of these sharia courts, as well as clerics, local leaders, 
and militias formed the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and overran a U.S. backed alliance 
of militias known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism 
(Carson, 2009).  Since the fall of the Barre regime, the ICU proved to be the first power 
to exercise broad control over most of southern Somalia (Liepman, 2009).  This Islamist 
movement, strongly linked to the Hawiye clan-family, rapidly took control of most major 
cities in the region including the capital Mogadishu but excluding the independent 
Puntland/Somiland regions in the north (Issa-Salwe & Olden, 2008, p. 579).   
The initial review of the ICU by Somalis was overwhelmingly positive as stability 
was established, business became productive, and general order was maintained 
(Menkhaus, 2009).  Businesses and the Somali Diaspora generally supported the ICU as 
Somalis began to believe that the worst of the 15-year unrest was over (Menkhaus, 2009).  
However, the ICU, while garnering the widespread support of Somalis at home and 
abroad, also began to force out the more moderate voices in its movement (Menkhaus, 
2009).  In so doing, the party also undertook two policies that led to its ultimate downfall.  
The first, is the “blithe” dismissal of U.S. requests to expel a small number of believed al-
Qaeda fighters who were operating in Somalia; and second, the continued antagonism 
against neighboring Ethiopia (Menkhaus, 2009).  
During this rise of the ICU, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) under 
President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, which had been forced to flee to neighboring Kenya 
during the 2005–2006 unrest, attempted to return to Somalia and made its new seat of 
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government in Baidoa (Issa-Salwe & Olden, 2008).  At the request of the TFG, in 2006, 
Ethiopian forces, with the backing of the United States, launched an offensive that 
effectively overthrew the ICU, its leadership and routed the ICU’s violent militant wing, 
al-Shabaab (Orr, 2009).  Al-Shabaab (“the youth”), led by Adan Hashi Ayro, a veteran of 
the Afghanistan jihad who trained with Al-Qaeda prior to 2001, developed the group 
under the auspices of the ICU in 2005 (2009, p. 6). The TFG, under the protection of the 
Ethiopian army retook the capital city of Mogadishu on December 28, 2006 (Gartenstein-
Ross & Gruen, 2009).   
However, within weeks of the defeat, former ICU and Al-Shabaab militias began 
an effective and organized insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military (Orr, 
2009).   Al-Shabaab’s military commander, Ayro answered to Hassan Dahir Aweys, an 
individual designated as a terror suspect by the United States for his past leadership role 
in Al-Ittiad al-Islamiyya (Patterson, 2009). The Ethiopian and TFG responded to the 
insurgency with military force, which led to a devastating conflict throughout the country 
that ultimately displaced 700,000 residents out of a population of 1.3 million in 
Mogadishu and destroyed much of the remaining private and public infrastructure within 
the capital city (Samatar A., 2008).   
The subsequent two years 2006-2008 has seen extensive disease and starvation 
and by 2008, one third of all “humanitarian casualties” recorded worldwide were in 
Somalia (Amensty International, 2008).  Making matters worse, according to Amnesty 
International, approximately 6,000 civilians have been killed since 2007, with allegations 
of war crimes rampant on both sides (Amensty International, 2008).   
In January 2009, the Ethiopian army withdrew from Somalia leaving Somalia 
more or less where it had begun in 2006 (Gettleman, 2009).  Upon the Ethiopians’ 
withdraw, moderate Islamist leaders took control of Somalia, including the new 
president, a former school teacher Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed (Gettleman, 2009).  
Currently, the government is defended by approximately 5000 African Union troops 
however only portions of the capital remain in control of the transitional government. 
(Gettleman, 2009). 
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Despite the desperate situation however, the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops has 
led to a decline in support for jihadist in the region, particularly al-Shabaab (Gettleman, 
2009).  As the Christian Ethiopian army has withdrawn, al-Shabaab’s continued presence 
and strong-arm tactics have created a rift between them and the general population.  A 
defector of al-Shabaab movement explained, “Our commanders were trying to tell us that 
there’s no Somali national flag and no national borders,” and the “jihad will never end.  
Once we finish in Somali, we go to Kenya and then elsewhere” (Gettleman, 2009).  This 
decline in support may ultimately prove to reduce the overall appeal of jihadism in the 
diaspora community as well, as much of the Somali outrage has largely been 
nationalistic, as opposed to religious, in nature.  Another problem, however, is pointed 
out by Gettleman, that while it appears the Somali population may be growing weary of 
the jihadist many terrorism analysts contend that Somalia continues to be a magnet for 
non-Somali “jihadists looking for the next holy war” (2009).  These non-Somali 
extremists are attracted to Somalia as the new religious battlefront against the West, 
much as Afghanistan and the cause of the mujahedeem did during the Soviet occupation.   
2. Somali Religion 
Although Somalis have a long history with Islam and most Somalis are Muslim, 
Islam in Somalia continues to be a “veil lightly worn” (CTC-USMA, 2006, p. 29). Even 
so, Islam is the official religion of Somalia and with very few exceptions Somalia 
remains one of the most religiously homogeneous countries in the world with an 
estimated 99 percent of all Somalis being practicing Sunni Muslims  (Gall, 1998, p. 386).  
Somalis as a people have practiced Islam for over a thousand years, after it was brought 
to East Africa by the Arabian Peninsula in the ninth-century (International Crisis Group, 
2005).  Somalis historically follow Shafi’i version of the faith characterized by the 
veneration of saints, including the ancestors of many Somali clans, and has traditionally 
been dominated by apolitical Sufi orders, which stresses the spiritual aspect of religious 
experiences (International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 1).  However, a more fundamentalist 
versions of Islam, such as Wahabbism, which has been imported by neighboring Gulf 
States, does exist (Lewis I., 1998).   
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The Somali practice of Islam weaves in tribal and pre-Prophet customs, and 
maintains cultural practices that would otherwise conflict with a more fundamentalist 
Sunni practice. These include the siyaaro, which is a pilgrimage to the tombs of Saints, 
many of which are tribal/clan ancestors; the celebration of Mawliid (the birthday of the 
Prophet Mohammed); and the application of clan/custom law (xeer) and civil law not 
based upon Sharia (Lewis I., 1998).  In fact, in many Somali areas where traditional 
practices thrive, cases when xeer law conflicts with Sharia law, the binding authority will 
be xeer.  Other aspects of Somali culture that tends to show moderation in Muslim 
observance includes not requiring women to veil, the use of the amphetamine khat, which 
in some practices incorporated into religious customs and the pre-Islamic practice of 
female circumcision,2 all of which are strongly opposed by Salafis and Wahhabist 
Muslims (Lewis I., 1998). 
The rise of Salafi Islam however has been a relatively recent phenomenon in 
Somalia and has gained on and off again prosperity since the fall of the Barre government 
in 1991 (Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa, 2005).  The term Salafi derives its name 
from al-Salaf al-Salih and was originally a modernist reform movement, however it is 
now more closely associated with a puritan and fundamentalist tradition based upon 
literalist readings of scripture (International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 1).   
This modern rise in Salafist doctrine in Somalia coincides with the rise of the 
Islamic Courts Union discussed above and the subsequent imposition of sharia courts and 
Islamic schools.  This rise can be attributed largely within Somalia to the presence of 
well-funded Gulf State charities and relief organizations, which while providing much 
needed humanitarian aid, also serve a missionary role for salafi Islam (Menkhaus, 2009).  
While many Somalis have accepted the presence of Islamists groups in their midst in 
exchange for security, there is evidence that this form of Islam may not be universally 
acceptable.  As Ken Menkhaus states, the tolerance of salafists in Somalia is a 
begrudging and probably temporary acceptance due to Somali’s pastoral life “imbuing 
                                                 
2 This practice, also known in the west as female genital mutilation, is practiced by Christians and 
Muslims in at least 37 countries throughout Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Ross-Sheriff, 
2003). 
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the culture with a strong preference for pragmatism over ideology” (2002, p. 111).  
Despite this pragmatic tolerance, many Somalis find dogmatic salafism, with its 
transnationalist views and banning of many Somali cultural traits, such as khat, to be an 
unacceptable Arab infringement (Lewis I., 1998).   
An observation of Islamic practice in Somalia and the tension between the 
varying practices is shown in translated letters from Al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia 
between 1990–1993; these were translated as part of the U.S. Military Academy’s 
Harmony project (CTC-USMA, 2006).  These Al-Qaeda operatives echo Menkhaus’s 
opinion that Sufi Islam serves as a barrier to jihadist recruitment.  In one letter, Sayf al-
Islam, an al-Qaeda operative working in Somalia, coins the Sufi/Salafi divide as “the 
problem,” which appears to serve as a barrier between Sufis and Islamists in day to day 
relations (Database, 1992–1993).  Sayf explains the difficulty in working to maintain 
peace between the two sects in order, as Sayf describes it, to “win them [the population] 
over step by step” from Sufism (Database, 1992–1993).  However, even the Al-Qaeda 
operatives acknowledge that Somalis as a general rule view the imposition of strict 
Islamic doctrine as a Gulf Arab custom that is “un-Somali” (Lewis I., 2004). 
However, just as Somali pragmatism can drive Somalis away from political Islam, 
so to can the “felt necessities of the times” cause Somalis to rally under the banner of 
Islam (Holmes, 1991).  This energy for zealousness is particularly heightened when there 
is a threat from an outside (i.e., non-Muslim) force, such as the British during 
colonization or more recently the Christian Ethiopian incursion (Menkhaus, 2002, p. 
110).  In fact, the only two times in Somali history that Islamists have successfully 
mobilized large numbers of Somalis is in fighting foreign Christians—the first is Said 
Mohamed Abdullah Hassan (the “Mad Mullah”) against British and Italian colonization 
in the early twentieth-century and the second against the Abyssinian conquest in the 
sixteenth-century (CTC-USMA, 2006, p. 29).  
When coming to the United States, the Somali version of Islam appears to retain 
much of its nuances as practiced in Somalia (OSP1, 2009).  However, as can be seen in 
Chapter V, it is likely that the religious practice will not stay stagnant but will rather  
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become more mainstream with that of the rest of the United States’ Muslim population.  
This may include the adoption of a more Salafist form of Islam, although not necessarily 
political Islam. 
3. “Clannism” 
One of the most resilient features of Somali society is that of the clan.  As I. M. 
Lewis points out, while the Somali nation-state is an “accidental aggregate of peoples and 
tribes thrown together more or less by geographic boundaries . . . .  the clans serve as the 
basic building blocks of Somali society” (2004, p. 489).  These invisible forces of 
clanship predate the nation state of Somalia and have survived the rise and fall of both 
democratic and authoritarian governments alike.  These forces have frequently played an 
integral role in bringing about the demise of both. 
This clan identity and family lineage serve as an oral calling card among Somalis 
and serves as the basis for Somali personal identity.  A poignant example of the 
importance of this lineage is provided by a British journalist reporting from the capital, 
Mogadishu, following the overthrow of the president, Mohamed Siyad Barre, in 1991.  
The journalist, who was observing a queue of civilians waiting to pass through a 
roadblock manned by rebels, describes the following (Hartley, 2004, p. 184): 
As each person was waved through, another came forward and began 
uttering a litany of names. My guide with the flaming red hair said the 
people were reciting their clan family trees. The genealogies tumbled back 
generation after generation to a founding ancestor. It was like a DNA 
helix, or a fingerprint, or an encyclopedia of peace treaties and blood debts 
left to fester down the torrid centuries. I was thinking how poetic this idea 
was, when bang!, a gunman shot one of the civilians, who fell with blood 
gushing from his head and was pushed aside onto a heap of corpses. 
“Wrong clan,” said my flaming-haired friend. “He should have borrowed 
the ancestors of a friend.” (Issa-Salwe & Olden, 2008, p. 574) 
The Somali clan system is a “national” genealogy, an ethnic family tree divided 
through paternal descent (in the male line) with each clan named after the founding 
ancestors of the group (Lewis I., , 2004, p. 494).  The highest fork in this genealogical 
tree can be traced back to two brothers, “Samaale” and ”Sab”.  These two brothers and 
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their descendents form what can be called the “clan-family” (Lewis I., 2004, p. 495).  
Below this clan-family exists the actual clans, which range in size between 20,000 and 
100,000 members, although 20,000 is considered an average number (Lewis I., 1998).  
Below the clans are numerous sub-clans and lineages that further define the family and 
identity of the individual. The “Samaale” clan-family stems from nomadic pastoralists of 
Somalia and are the predominate clan family in both Somalia and the diaspora (Lewis I., 
1998).  This clan family is made up of four families, the Dir, Daarood, Isaq and Hawiye 
(Lewis I., 1998).     
The “Sab” clan-family, by contrast, originates from agro-pastoralists and are 
broken down into two clan families of the Digil and Rahanweyn clans (Lewis I., 2004).  
These clans generally occupy the more agriculturally rich Somali area between the 
Shebelle and Juba Rivers in southern Somalia (Lewis I., 2004, p. 495).    
The majority of the Somali population is made up of these six clans.  These clans 
can be further divided into numerous sub-claims, for example, the Samaale’s Dir clan is 
divided into the Issa and Badabursi sub-clans (Issa-Salwe & Olden, 2008).  The Daarood 
clan also can be divided into the Mijerteyn, the Dulbahante, the Warsangeli, the 
Marrehen and the Ogaden tribes (Issa-Salwe & Olden, 2008).  
The clan continues to be an important social structure in both Somalia and its 
diaspora community, although in the diaspora its significance as the fundamental 
“principle of personal and social identity” varies greatly (Lewis I.,  2004, p. 490).  For 
instance, clannism, especially in unstable environments such present-day Somalia, 
remains the basis for security and support within the society.  As a pastoral society, 
Somalis rely heavily upon the clan system in order to implement social order and conduct 
general governance of areas.  This reliance on clanship varies with the availability of 
alternative sources for such security, support, and identity.  The growth and reliance upon 
clannism in Somalia since the beginning of the Somali civil war has been exponential as 
the clan frequently has served as sole source of security within the community; this is 
especially true with respect to the clan-based Sharia court systems (Lewis I., 2004, p. 
505).  In more peaceful times, when a functioning government exists, or in a stable 
western diaspora where social supports and security are available through a state 
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apparatus the necessity for the clan dissipates.  As I.M. Lewis states, “the clan divisions 
of the nation tend to unify reactively in response to external pressures and to dissociate 
when they disappear” (2004, p. 493).  As will be discussed in Chapter V, in western 
nations where identity is developed by the individual, the clan identity can also be 
challenged as individuals struggle with defining themselves separate from lineage.   
The prevalence of the clan within the diaspora is difficult to define with precision.  
As OLE1 stated, the clan continues to be a prevalent force within this community, 
particularly among middle age and older Somalis (OLE1, 2009).  When asked how 
clannism fares in the younger Somali population, OLE1 replied that many young Somalis 
claim that the “clan is not important, that we are all Somalis,” but at the same time they 
will still live segregated from other clans and overtly shun other Somalis based solely 
upon their clan affiliation (2009).   
Anecdotally, OSP1 relayed a story illustrating the resiliency of these clan ties.  
According to OSP1, an area Somali female disappeared in a Columbus, Ohio park.  The 
woman’s clan organized an impromptu search party to go look for her.  During the search 
a Somali man from a Westside clan arrived to offer his help but was turned away by 
organizers who stated “she’s not from your clan so what do you care?” (OSP1, 2009).  
OLE1 and MLE1 both stated that younger Somalis will profess to outsiders that clan 
affiliation is not important (OLE1 & MLE1, 2009).  However, despite their claims, the 
clan still appears to play an important role in residential location, marriages, and identity 
(2009).   
A review of where Somalis live also shed little light on how clan integrity fares in 
the U.S.  For instance, in the Columbus, Ohio Diaspora, OSP1 indicated that 
communities continue to be separated along clan lines, with clan affiliation continuing 
within the west and north Columbus communities (2009).  OLE1 however indicated that 
while the minority Bantu population resides in the west side of Columbus, a large 
smattering of different Somali clans exist throughout the city (OLE1, 2009).  The 
Marehen (sub-clan of Darood) remain the most prominent clan in the Columbus area 
(OLE1, 2009).  The clan divide was not as observable in the Minneapolis/St. Paul  
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Diaspora according to MLE1, who observed that the close living arrangements, 
particularly high-rise apartment buildings within the Twin Cities has deteriorated the 
prevalence of the clans amongst the Somalis (MLE1, 2009). 
4. Pastoralism3 
As mentioned above, historically the primacy clans of Somalia have their roots in 
a pastoralist heritage, with four of the six clans assuming a pastoral lifestyle.  Despite 
extensive urbanization over the last 50 years in Somalia, approximately 50–60 percent of 
the population continues to live a pastoral lifestyle (CTC-USMA, 2006, p. 30).  The 
significance of pastoralism, especially in forming theories about jihadism and 
radicalization, is far from universally agreed upon.  In one respect, societies with a 
history of pastoralism have proven difficult to organize politically due to their 
independent structure and lack of a clear need for central governance. As Arab explorer 
Richard Burton explained it, the Somalis are “a fierce and turbulent race of republicans” 
or later as an outspoken sergeant in the British-African corps judged “Somalis no good, 
every man his own chief” (Lewis I., p. 493).  Both of these examples are directly 
attributable to pastoral societies where a central, national government is not necessary for 
day-to-day existence, but rather the individual and his family group is of primary 
importance.  To the contrary, a jihadist doctrine discourages this sort of clan identity in 
favor of a more transnational identity.  Instead of an obligation to the family, Salafi 
jihadism emphasizes an obligation to a worldwide Muslim peoplehood (umma).  These 
differences in global outlooks and allegiances may explain why historically Salafism has 
not been a widely marketable belief system to pastoralist societies where “every man is 
his own chief” (Lewis I., p. 493).   
Other important aspects of pastoral life, when considering the propensity toward 
radicalization, is the pastoral disposition toward “honor cultures” (Nisbett, 1996).  
Generally, an “honor culture” is one where an individual as a cultural expectation is 
required to protect his honor, including by force if necessary (Nisbett, 1996).  “Honor” in 
                                                 
3 Pastoralism is defined as “the practice of herding as the primary economic activity of a society.”  
(Dictionary.com, 2009). 
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this context is defined not so much as an individual’s personal honesty or integrity but 
rather as the individual’s “social status, precedence, or right to respect” (Stewart, 1994).  
Honor cultures normally arise within societies in which the individual has an economic 
risk from his fellow contemporaries and the state is either weak or non-existent in 
protecting these interests (Stewart, 1994).  Within a herding or pastoral society, this is 
particularly true where a herder’s livelihood is based upon his ability to protect his flock 
and ward off thieves and competing herdsmen.  Under pastoral circumstances, herders 
must not only be able to defend their flock but that ability must be sufficiently 
“advertised” to the larger community (Stewart, 1994).     
In a tribal-pastoral society such as Somalia, this honor culture tends to be held in 
the collective amongst the tribe and serves as “a cohesive force that strengthens the 
group’s identity by defining its boundaries and providing defense against competing 
groups, and is more important that individual honor” (Moritz, 2008, p. 103).  As a result, 
in tribal, pastoralist societies, the “honor of the collective” is the primary objective 
because the tribe as a whole protects and defends the security and economic interests of 
the members (Moritz, 2008, p. 103).  This may in part help to explain the importance of 
clan and clan identity within the Somali community discussed in section three of this 
chapter.   
What is most notable about this “honor of the collective” is the fact that research 
indicates that, as with other honor cultures, these collectives exhibit resiliency through 
generations even when the society itself has urbanized out of the grazing lands (Nisbett, 
1996).  This honor culture manifests itself in various forms of Somali society, including 
the diaspora communities.   
As noted by Scuglik and Alarcon, this tribal violence and clan mentality remain 
an integral part of Somali culture and may explain in part the role of gangs striving for 
social statute in  immigrant communities (2005, p. 23).  These manifestations could also 
help to explain why individuals who have never stepped foot in their Somali homeland 
react so viscerally to allegations of war crimes against Somali women who they have 
never met, or why missteps by law enforcement against an individual in the Somali 
communities is internalized by the entire community.  MLE1 speculated much of the 
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impediment to outreach in the Somali community on the federal side stems from the 
massive FBI “roundups” of Muslims shortly after 9/11 (MLE1, 2009).  Despite being 
eight years removed, this memory remains imbedded in the Somali-American psyche.  
MLE1 noted also the Somali sensitivity towards slights or signs of disrespect, explaining 
how one misstep would close the door forever to an individual (2009).   
5. History of the U.S. Somali-Diaspora 
A diaspora is generally defined as a community or group who share “a common 
origin who reside, more less on a permanent basis, outside of the borders of their 
homeland” (Barth, 2003, p. 452).  In their host land, these groups identify themselves or 
are identified by others as part of their homeland’s national community, and generally 
participate in the affairs of their homeland, either politically, economically or socially 
(Barth, 2003, p. 452).   
Diasporas and their homeland have a complex relationship that changes 
depending upon the conditions in both lands.  The diaspora’s role can be both passive and 
active (Barth, 2003).  These passive roles take on many forms, including instances where 
the diaspora community is blamed by other members of the hostland for events and 
actions of their homeland (Barth, 2003).  Examples of this include the negative treatment 
of members of the Iranian Diaspora in the U.S. by non-Iranian U.S. citizens during the 
Iran Hostage Crisis or the internment of Japanese Americans after the bombing of Pearl 
Harbor. 
Unlike the passive roles listed above, diasporas can assume an active role as well 
and thereby influence the foreign policy of their host land and the actions of their 
homeland.  For instance, a recent study by the World Bank found that “by far the 
strongest effect of war on the risk of subsequent war works through Diasporas.  After five 
years of post-conflict peace, the risk of renewed conflict is around six times higher in the 
societies with the largest Diasporas in American [emphasis added] than in those without 




their relative prosperity and ability to access political systems appear to have a greater 
capacity to effect conditions and politics in their homeland than other Diaspora 
communities (Barth, 2003, p. 451).  
At their best, these diasporas can serve as bridges between host and homelands; 
they can provide significant economic support to their homelands and can “transmit the 
values of pluralism and democracy” back to their homelands (Barth, 2003, p. 450).  
Diasporas, in many countries, serve as a crucial financial lifeline for the population, and, 
as in Somalia, can provide a pool of educated and prepared leaders for the homeland.   
However, not everything that diasporas bring to the table is positive for either the 
homeland or host land.  As stated above in the World Bank findings, diasporas can 
frequently serve as the financier and instigators of violent unrest through the support of 
extremists, terrorists, and insurgencies.  As stated by Barth, the interest that the diaspora 
sometimes has in the homeland is one of collective identity or connection with the 
people, not the actual state (2003, p. 455).  For example, during the first Palestinian 
intifada in Israel, many American Jews pressured Israel to adopt a moderate response to 
the uprising on the perception that “Jews do not break bones” (Barth, 2003, p. 455).  This 
detachment allows diasporas to see conflicts and national interests in more dogmatic 
lights instead of the more pragmatic view that individuals who are trapped living in war 
zones will normally adopt.   
Furthermore, diasporas can “internationalize” or “broaden [a local] conflicts by 
importing it to the hostland,” which thereby expands the local conflict to an international 
one (Barth, p. 450).  As Lyons (2004) states: 
Conflict-generated Diaspora groups are not societies to promote Esperanto 
or to study long gone cultures.  They are social networks that link past 
conflict, the contemporary challenges of living in a host state and an 
aspiration of return to a particular piece of territory that is the symbolically 
important homeland. 
This “link,” as Lyons states, includes the fluid interaction back and forth between 
hostland and homeland with respect to how its diaspora community is treated and how 
the homeland perceives this treatment of its diaspora members.   
 36
a. Somali Immigration 
Immigration from Somalia and other African countries to the United 
States has grown exponentially over the last three decades.  During period from 1971 to 
1980, the number of African immigrants to the U.S. was 80,779 (Healy, 2009).  Between 
1981 and a 1990, this number jumped to 176,893 and would later double to 354,000 
during the period from 1991 to 2000 (Putnam, 1993).   
Similarly, the numbers for refugees from Somali has risen dramatically, 
and this directly reflects the political instability in the region.  The 1990 U.S. Census 
counted the Somali population in the United States at only 2,070 (Putnam, 1993).  The 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) reported in 1985 that only 139 Somalis 
were admitted to the United States (2001).  However, with the fall of the Barre regime in 
1991 and the on-set of the violent warlord period, the numbers increased exponentially.  
In 1996, the number of Somali immigrants increased to 6500 and, by 2003, over 43,000 
Somalis had entered the United States (Healy, 2009). 
Today, the estimates for the number of Somali-Americans living in the 
United States vary greatly.  Estimates range from conservatively 30,000, based upon 
official 2000 U.S. Census totals, to over 200,000 as reported by Somali community 
organizations (Woessner, 2002).  It is probably safe to assume that the actual number of 
Somalis living in the United States is significantly larger than the 2000 census estimates.  
First, since the census, there has continued to be migration by Somalis to the United 
States since 2000. According to the Office of Immigration Statistics, Annual Flow Report 
(2008), refugees from Somalia have continued with the Office of Immigration Services 
(OIS) reporting refugee/asylee migration from Somalia to the United States at the 
following rates: 10,405 in 2005; 10,357 in 2006; and 6,969 in 2007 (Jeffreys, 2007).  As 
a result, the 30,000 estimate in 2000 is at least doubled based upon 2005–2007 numbers.     
According to the U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement, the two largest 
Somali populations in the U.S. are in Twin Cities of Minneapolis/St. Paul and Columbus, 
Ohio (Jeffreys, 2007).  It is estimated that each of these communities has between 17,000 
and 80,000 residents who identify themselves as Somali (Jeffreys, 2007).  However, it is 
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difficult to estimate the actual numbers (SSD1, 2009).  Part of this difficulty lies in the 
fact that refugees often do not choose where they are originally settled.  The U.S. 
Department of State will frequently determine where new refugees are settled (SSD1, 
2009).  However, once a population is settled, it frequently will move based upon familial 
ties to other communities, employment opportunities, housing/schools, or simply 
unhappiness with current location (SSD1, 2009).  For instance, large groups of Somalis 
can be found in Shelbeyville, Tennessee and Lewiston, Maine, not because the State 
Department originally settled them there, but rather they moved for affordable housing or 
employment opportunities   
Regardless of their ultimate settlement location in the United States, 
“[f]ew countries in the world possess Diasporas with as much economic and political 
importance to their homeland as does Somalia” (Menkhaus, 2009).  As of 2004, Somalia 
was ranked as the fourth most remittance dependent nation in the world (United Nations 
Development Project, 2009).  The Somali Diaspora’s annual contributions to the 
homeland are estimated to be between 2.5 to 3 billion dollars and serve as one of the 
cornerstones of the Somali economy (Healy, 2009).  These remittances, according to the 
World Bank, represented 23percent of the average Somali household income and as an 
extreme example, in the Hargeisa province of Somaliland, up to 25 percent of households 
claimed remittances as their sole source of income (Healy, 2009, p. 19).   
Laura Hammond contends that “[r]emittances result in the strengthening 
of this transnational community that exists in multiple localities [and the] , , , inability or 
failure to remit can weaken the social ties, sow the seeds of conflict and alienation of the 
sender” (Hammond, 2006).  With respect to Somali cultures, the failure to live up to this 
obligation can sometimes have dire consequences, such as a lack of marriage prospects 
for a family that fails on its remittance obligations.  Despite the burdens of remittance 
payments and the difficult economic situation many U.S. Somalis find themselves in, 
there is little evidence of “remittance fatigue” among the American-Somali Diaspora 
(Healy, 2009, p. 19).  Despite Healy’s contention, however, one interviewee did indicate 
that in his experience, the dire need in the homeland and the ubiquiteness of 
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telecommunications between the diaspora and homeland makes the frequent requests for 
money a begrudgingly tolerated burden for the community (OLE1, 2009). 
Other on-going connections between the Somali Diaspora and homeland 
include what can be called “human capital” remittances that significantly shape the 
country and its politics.  This human capital remittance is the practice of western 
educated diaspora members returning to their homeland to serve in the government or in 
other positions of leadership.  For instance, the first Prime Minister of the Transitional 
Nation Government (TNG), as well as many of his cabinet, were from the Somali 
Diaspora community.  In Somaliland, 10 of the 29 Ministers of the government came 
from the Somali Diaspora.  As of January 2008, approximately two-thirds of the cabinet 
and the Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), are members of 
the Somali Diaspora (Healy, 2009, p. 15).    
This large involvement of the diaspora in Somalia indicates the 
transborder nature of the Somali community.  As one interviewee pointed out, it is 
difficult for western minds to understand the nature of the relationship between the 
diaspora and the Somali homeland (MLE1, 2009).  It is not the same as a westerner, of 
Scandinavian descent, wanting to visit Sweden.  In that case, the westerner visiting his 
Scandinavian homeland is going as a tourist (MLE1, 2009).  However, the Somali 
émigrés generally intend to return to their homeland and continue to maintain close 
family connections (MLE1, 2009).  These connections are more like returning to one’s 
hometown, with those same hometown family, friends and history (MLE1, 2009).  
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V. CRISIS OF CULTURE 
The necessary backdrop in assessing the radicalization process of members of the 
Somali-American Diaspora lies in understanding the “crisis of culture” that exists within 
the second and third generation émigrés in this community.  This crisis of culture, as 
described by OSP1, is actually a crisis of identity among the second generation created 
by the “push” to integrate into Western society while at the same time feeling the “pull” 
of their Somali identity.  Although this tension is a relatively global phenomenon for 
immigrant youth, as demonstrated by struggles with language, perceived and real 
discrimination, cultural incompatibilities, and conflicts between adults and children, 
Somali children encounter greater difficult in integration than other groups due to the 
unique nature of their culture (Scuglik & Alarcon, 2005).  As explained by Andrew 
Liepman, Deputy Director of Intelligence at the U.S.’s National Counterterrorism Center, 
the American Somali community’s “relative linguistic isolation and sudden adjustment to 
American society has reinforced, in some areas, their greater insularity compared to other 
more integrated Muslim immigrant communities” and “has aggravated the challenges of 
assimilation for their children” (Liepman, 2009).  This chapter will discuss these 
challenges of assimilation described by Liepman, and how it creates a crisis of identity 
within the Somali Diaspora that may render Somalis susceptible to radicalization.   
The integrative experience of the Somali Diaspora in the U.S. has generally been 
characterized by the formation of “tightly knit and insular enclaves” that are 
predominantly “poor and overwhelmingly uneducated” (Menkhaus, 2009).  According to 
2007 U.S. Census data, the Somali community is considered among the poorest and 
newest immigrant communities in the United States with nearly 60 percent of the U.S. 
Somali Diaspora community having arrived in the United States since 2000 (Bureau, 
2007).  The 2007, U.S. Census indicates that 51 percent of the Somali Diaspora 
community lives in poverty with a median household income of $21,461, compared with 
the national median of $61,173 (Bureau, 2007).  Furthermore, the Somali American 
Diaspora is also one of the youngest émigré communities with an average age of 26.8 
(Bureau, 2007).  As a result of this, this community “suffers the highest unemployment 
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rate among East African Diaspora communities and . . . . the lowest rate of college 
graduation” (Liepman, 2009, p. 2) with over 50 percent of all Somalis under the age of 25 
not having not completed high school (Pew Research Center, 2007). 
These statistics indicate a serious issue regarding Somali integration.  This poor 
integration is mainly caused by two interdependent factors: a lack of English language 
proficiency and acculturation stress (“culture shock”) brought about by race and the 
pressures of westernization.   
A. THE LANGUAGE BARRIER 
Eighteen years of relative lawlessness in Somalia has caused illiteracy rates to 
skyrocket and has all but decimated the homeland’s formal education system.  According 
to A. Samatar, literacy in Somalia has declined since the beginning of the civil war in 
1991 from 75 percent to 20 percent in 2006 (University of Minnesota, 2008).  This is in 
stark contrast to pre-civil war eras where it would be common for an educated Somali to 
know the national Somali dialect, English, Italian, and Arabic (Samatar A., 2008).  
However, today, new arrivals to America are significantly burdened not only by a lack of 
knowledge of English but also illiteracy in their own Somali dialect.  As a result, this can 
translate in English proficiency at less than 20 percent of the first generation Somali 
Diasporants in the U.S. (OSP1, 2009).     
Aggravating this problem is the fact that the émigré process gives few 
opportunities for parents to obtain a working knowledge of the English language.  
According to a SSD1, who works within the Columbus Somali community, the language 
programs offered to new immigrant arrivals operate off of the concept of “attendance not 
results” (SSD1, 2009).  This means that the contractor for language services is paid based 
upon the attendance, not whether any results are actually achieved for the students 
(SSD1, 2009).  Many times a Somali émigré will teach the class in his native tongue with 
very little English actually being spoken, which exacerbates the problem (SSD1, 2009).   
Proficiency in English, more than any other factor, alters both a young 
diasporant’s identity and his relationship to his family in the U.S. (Scuglik & Alarcon, 
2005).  In the field of immigration studies, it generally accepted that acquisition of 
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English (in English speaking hostlands) is the most important driver for acculturation into 
the host society for an immigrant population (Guarnaccia & Lopez, 1998).  The 
acquisition of English “turbo charges” the acculturation process, especially among young 
immigrants who will rapidly adopt western culture; just as their parents, who may not be 
fluent, will either stay stagnant culturally or in many cases retreat deeper into their 
homeland’s culture (Guarnaccia & Lopez, 1998).   
In many cases where young adults acquire English while parents do not, the 
family roles are altered; the young men become the family’s communication link to the 
outside world.  This role of family representative dramatically shifts power from a 
historically patriarchal structure to one in which a teenage boy or young adult is making 
decisions regarding traditional parental responsibilities and roles, such as paying of bills.  
English-proficient teens can also learn to manipulate family situations to their advantage 
by filtering communications, which further shifts the balance of power in the household 
(Guarnaccia & Lopez, 1998, p. 23).  This is made worse, according to MLE1 (and 
reinforced by Guarnaccia & Lopez in their 1998 study), where parents in the Somali 
community are unsure regarding the legal limits of discipline over children in the United 
States (Guarnaccia & Lopez; 1998; MLE1, 2009).  In many cases, Somali parents 
believe, or are told by their English-speaking children, that they cannot physically 
discipline their children because of American laws regarding corporal punishment 
(Guarnaccia & Lopez, 1998).  As a result, this language gap also serves to widen the 
cultural and identity gap between Somali youth and their parents and community. 
B. ACCULTURATION ISSUES—RACE, IDENTITY, AND CULTURE 
SHOCK 
After coming to America, Somalis may for the first time encounter “race” as a 
method of social classification.  In coming to the United States’ racially heterogeneous 
and race-conscious society, Somalis move from a majority status in both race and religion 
in their homeland to being faced with a minority status in both.    
In their homeland, Somalis live in one of the most homogenous societies in the 
world, as over 99 percent of the country is Sunni Muslim and “black” (Guarnaccia & 
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Lopez, 1998).  By contrast, in coming to the United States, a Muslim émigré will join 
approximately 2.4 million other Muslims out of a total population of 300 million U.S. 
citizens, thereby making up less than one percent of the U.S. population (Pew Research 
Center, 2007, p. 10).  While Somalis historically have adopted an identity based upon 
religion and clan, this issue of race being either “white and black” shifts the nature of 
identity to a racial one, as they are placed by the larger society that is more race 
conscious than their homogenous homeland (Ajrouch & Kusow, 2007, p. 76).  As a 
result, Somalis feel categorized by the larger society as “black,” instead of more familiar 
identities as Muslim, Somali, or Hawiye clan, identities that they may have maintained in 
their homeland for generations.   
This new classification may not only be new for Somalis but also unwelcomed.  
As identity is first, “who I say I am,” and second, “who society says I am,” a conflict 
arises within Somalis between what society seeks to impose and how the individual or 
community view themselves (Stone, 1962).  This is especially true where the imposed 
identity is not perceived as advantageous or desirable to the group or individual (Stone, 
1962).  In these cases, the individual will attempt to assert an alternative identity, such as 
nationality or religion (Stone, 1962).   
In the case of Somalis, their arrival to the U.S. may be marked with the label of 
“black,” which will be rejected by Somalis in lieu of an alternate identity.  Researchers 
studying the integration of African migrant communities to Western nations have found 
almost universally this rejection phenomenon of the immigrant population away from the 
“black” community (African-American) towards alternative identities (Ajrouch, 2007).4  
Most studies have found that in lieu of integrating into the U.S. “black” identity, migrant 
communities tend to stress alternative identities such as nationalism and religion 
(Ajrouch, 2007).  Interestingly, the converse of this principal applies in a study of  
 
 
                                                 
4 This phenomenon is not restricted to Somalis; many black émigrés coming to the United States will 
react in a similar manner including Jamaican, Haitian, Ethiopian, Senegalese, and Trinidad émigrés (Foner, 
1987; Stafford, 1973; Waters, 2003; Woldemikael, 1989).  
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Lebanese émigrés who tend to integrate towards “white” U.S. societal identities and may 
not accentuate religious and nationalistic differences in comparison to their black African 
counterparts (Ajrouch & Kusow, 2007).   
A 2009 study of West African Muslims who immigrated to Harlem, New York 
revealed the same strengthening of nationalist and religious identity in an attempt to fend 
off the societal classification into the overall African-American community (Abdullah, 
2009).  In this study by Abdullah, West African Muslims, despite living in close 
proximity and working in the same economic community as their African-American 
counterparts, tended to accentuate their national and religious distinctions such dress and 
language from the larger community (2009). 
Strengthening of this alternate identity will also include becoming more devout 
religiously in order to further strengthen the groups “otherness.”  A vivid example of this 
can be found in the hijab (Muslim veil), which can be considered a strategic 
representation of the values and identity perceived to be superior to those of the dominant 
society (Ajrouch, 2007, p. 322).  In the Ajrouch study, researchers found that an 
overwhelming majority of Somali women in fact wear the hijab in Canada,5 despite the 
fact that women in Somalia “do not simply wear the hijab culturally” (Ajrouch & Kusow, 
2007, p. 89).  From this evidence, Ajrouch concludes that émigré groups to actually 
become more religious upon migration in order to distinguish themselves from ethnic 
classifications that they do not determine to be advantageous (Ajrouch & Kusow, 2007, 
p. 89). 
C. “LIVING LIKE A TURTLE” 
If first generation Somali refugees struggle to maintain an identity apart from the 
larger society and even strengthen their homeland identity, the second and third 
generation youth face a much greater problem as they attempt to please their parents and 
                                                 
5 While the Ajrouch study examined the Somali community in Canada, not the United States, the 
proximity of Canada to the U.S. and (as Ajrouch states) the proximate cultural values of the two countries 
make it somewhat comparable.  However, it is logical that with the United States history of slavery and 
racial discrimination against blacks, the hijab would become more important in the U.S. because “black” 
status may be seen as even more undesirable than in Canada.   
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community by retaining Somali culture and identity while at the same time assimilating 
into the larger educational and social structure of the U.S..  One Somali girl described the 
conflict to a U.S. newspaper reporter as “living like a turtle: you have to learn to live on 
both the land and the water, at home and at school” (Thatcher, 2000).  However, this 
land/water negotiation is difficult where both forces actively resist the other.  As an 
example, Shirwa Ahmed, one of the first Minnesota Somali youths to disappear, 
expressed bafflement at African-American student’s unwillingness to accept him when 
they (African-American Students) stated, “You’re not black, go back to Africa” (Elliott, 
2009).  Ahmed asked his friend, “[h]ow can they [African-American students] be mad at 
me for looking like them?  We’re from the same place” (Elliott, 2009, p. 4).  At the same 
time, African-American students were rejecting Ahmed for being “not black,” Ahmed’s 
relatives were criticizing him for mixing with and emulating the “ghetto people” (Elliott, 
2009, p. 4).   
W.E.B. Dubois, in 1903, summed up this polarity in cultures, and how it creates 
dissonance in identity by saying: 
Immigrant adolescents are both more vulnerable and more resilient to the 
challenges they face than the adults in their lives, but it also places them in 
a conflictual position between the original and the new.  It is an 
overwhelming challenge for many of these adolescents to attempt to 
merge such polar cultures and still allow comfort with individual identity. 
(DuBois, 1903)     
OSP1 explained this conflict between the “original and the new” by observing 
that the “freedoms, individualism and liberties” of American society creates a shock to 
the socio-centric identity of the Somali clan and family culture (OSP1, 2009).  In 
Somalia, the family and clan define identity for Somali youth, and cultural norms are 
taught to the young by the family (OSP1, 2009).  The fact that the family is also the only 
source for shelter, security, and education gives it the primacy and the authority to serve 
as the one voice for the young person’s identity (OSP1, 2009).  However, when Somalis 
come to the United States, culture is no longer taught exclusively by the family (OSP1, 
2009).  Rather, it is taught by a combination of community, the media, peers, and public 
education (OSP1, 2009).  Also, as many of the needs of individuals, such as security and 
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education, are met by society in the U.S. as opposed to the family, the family/clan take on 
less importance (OSP1, 2009).  Therefore, just as new, identity-shaping influences arise, 
the importance and reliance on the family dissipates.   
In these ways, the lack of integration is more akin to Muslim Diasporas in 
European nations where economic and integrative barriers abound frequently causing 
insular communities to form.  For example, as in the Twin Cities, the United Kingdom 
community of Beeston, which produced three of the four London 7/7 bombers, the 
diasporas are insular, generally residing together in tightly knit neighborhoods (Alsan, 
2009; MLE1, 2009).  Poverty in both communities is prevalent with high unemployment 
rates shared by both.  In the Minneapolis Somali community of Cedar-Riverside, the 
unemployment in 2000 was 17 percent, which is three times the state average of 5.8 
percent (Kasper et al., 2009, p. 9).  Similarly, the British government has stated that the 
economic conditions in Beeston Hills stand out as some of the worst in all of the United 
Kingdom (Alsan, 2009).  Likewise, the Pakistani Diaspora in the Beeston suffers from an 
increasing gang problem and issues with drugs and alcohol among Muslim youth, and 
like Minneapolis, clashes between youth along racial lines in both communities are 
common  (Adan, 2006; Alsan, 2009).     
All of these factors together serve to distort the identity of the young Somali.  
This crisis of identity leaves the individual torn between two identities, neither of which 
they fit into.  This gap leaves the young person vulnerable to jihadist recruiters who offer 
them an identity that transcends these two competing worlds in favor of an exciting and 
seemingly meaningful identity of jihadist (Sageman, 2003). 
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VI. THE “TRAVELERS” 
A. INTRODUCTION 
All of this talk of the movement must stop … focus on your life here.  If you 
become a doctor or an engineer, you can help your country.  Over there 
you will be a dead body on the street. (Elliott, 2009) 
The above quote was made by Minneapolis Imam, Sheikh Abdirahman Sheik 
Omar Ahmend, during a meeting in the spring of 2008 (Elliott, 2009).  The meeting was 
in response recent news that an area travel agent had turned away a young Somali man 
after he attempted to buy a plane ticket back to Somalia (Elliott, 2009).  In the crowd that 
evening listening to the imam were several young Somalis who in a few months would 
make the journey to Somalia and join their cohorts who had left in late 2007 (Elliott, 
2009).  These young men, or “travelers” as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
would later term them, were estimated by the FBI to be in the “tens” (Axe & Ulmer, 
2009).  However, the exact number of young men making the journey is difficult to 
determine for several reasons. First, parents may be unwilling to report the disappearance 
for fear that law enforcement will arrest their children upon returning; and second, the 
pressure felt in the tight knit community not to talk to law enforcement (MLE1, 2009).      
The scene at the mosque that spring evening was being played out throughout 
several Western countries as young Somali men from Europe and North America 
answered the call of jihad.  A British television station in 2009 reported approximately 60 
British-Somalis had returned to Somalia to fight (Rugman, 2009).  The news report told 
of a British national of Somali descent living in a London suburb who was a suicide 
bomber in Somalia in 2007.  The 21-year old man, a former college student in west 
London, in his martyrdom video encourages other Somalis to answer the call, stating, 
“are you pleased to live as slaves and die as slaves? Death and honor is better than life 
and humiliation . . . . I advise you to migrate to Somalia and wage war against your 
enemies” (Rugman, 2009).   
Similarly, in Sweden this phenomenon has played itself out, although on a smaller 
scale to the U.K. with an estimated 20 Swedish-Somalis returning to their homeland for 
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jihad (Landes, 2009).  This includes Yassin Ali, a Swedish citizen of Somali origin who 
after being arrested in Sweden for sending money to Al-Shabab returned in March of 
2009 to Somalia where he assumed a top leadership position with Hizbul Islaam, a 
recently formed coalition of insurgents in Somalia (Landes, 2009). 
B. “TRAVELERS” A NEW PHENOMENON? 
While the actions of the Twin Cities travelers were a shock to the community, it is 
worth noting that diasporic involvement in homeland conflicts is not a new phenomenon.  
Nor is this involvement strictly limited to the Islamic faith.  For example, many Jewish 
Diasporants since the creation of Israel have travelled to defend the homeland when it fell 
under attack (Mendoza, 2009).  Likewise, as pointed out by Lorenzo Vidino, the United 
States has several decades of experience with U.S. residence “travelling for jihad” 
(Vidino, 2009, p. 3).  During the 1990s, it is estimated that between 1,000 and 2,000 U.S. 
volunteers left to train with various jihadist groups throughout the world, a number 
comparable to European Muslims during the same year (Vidino, 2009, p. 5).  Many of 
these individuals were recruited and funneled through the Al Khifa recruiting network, 
which was funded and organized by Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden and Abdullah 
Azzam (National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [9/11 
Commission], 2004, p. 58).  Furthermore, Marc Sageman, in his study of four hundred 
terrorist biographies, found that 84 percent of “global salafi mujahedin” joined the 
jihadist movement while living in a diaspora (Sageman, 2004).  Likewise, the Committee 
on the Psychological Roots of Terrorism for the Madrid Summit on Terrorism (2005), 
consistent with Sageman’s findings, found that 80 percent of jihadist recruits joining and 
becoming radicalized in western diasporas (Post & Sheffer, 2007, p. 104).   
Therefore, the actual recruitment of Somali youth from their U.S. diaspora to their 
homeland should not be viewed as a totally new phenomenon.  However, unlike the 
1000–2000 Americans who joined the jihad in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, Somali 
Diasporants, in a post-9/11 environment, may pose a greater concern.  This is particularly 
true where the transnational jihadist organization they are joining has vowed to allegiance 
to al-Qaeda, an organization that has declared war on the United States (Wright, 2006).  
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Furthermore, unlike the jihadist of the 1990s, the problem of “redirecting” has become a 
concern for law enforcement, as illustrated by the U.K.’s experience. 
The United Kingdom’s experience with the July 7, 2005, attacks on the London 
underground illustrate the problem of travelers and homegrown terrorism.  In that attack, 
the ringleader Mohammed Siddique Khan originally travelled to Pakistan in November 
2004 to fight in the Islamist-declared jihad against coalition forces (BBC, 2008).  
However, Siddique Khan was at some point “redirected” back to the United Kingdom to 
attack his homeland (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).  This “redirecting,” which is the process of 
convincing a jihadist that his jihad is best fought against the “far enemy” (Western 
homelands and societies), is what has fostered a new concern for recruitment within these 
communities.   
This concern was validated in August of 2009 when four Australian nationals 
were arrested in Melbourne, Australia for plotting to attack the Holsworthy Army 
Barracks on the outskirts of Sidney, Australia (Jane's, 2009).  Three of the men were 
humanitarian refugees from Somalia.  Each man had a typical Somali refugee story of 
fleeing Somalia, spending a limited time in a Kenyan refugee camp, and them gaining 
refugee status into his host country of Australia.  All had fled Somalia as children, 
learned English, received a western education, and, by most accounts, integrated into 
Australian society.  However, at least one of the plotters, Yacqub Khayre, travelled to 
Somalia and received training from al-Shabab fighters and then returned to plan his 
attack in his hostland (Jane's, 2009). 
C. THE TWIN CITIES’ “TRAVELERS” 
A large data sample was not available regarding the Twin Cities youth who left 
their Minnesota home to travel to Somalia to fight with al-Shabaab.  Data was obtained 
on 14 of the individuals, including age, education status, criminal history, marital status, 
and affiliation with Somali youth gangs (see Table 1).  Information was taken from court 




several of the Somali travelers. The most extensive information available was for three 
individuals, Shirwa Ahmed, Mohamed Hassan, and Burhan Hassan, who will each be 
profiled individually below.    
This chapter will discuss the data collected on these individuals and then compare 
their profiles against other homegrown jihadists, taking into particular account the “crisis 
of culture” discussed above.  This is important as the central argument of this thesis is 
that this identity crisis is a necessary component in analyzing the trajectory of these 
youths in joining global jihad. 
Table 1.   Twin Cities “Travelers” 
Criminal Gang  
   Name Education Departed Age History History  
Shirwa Ahmed 
Some 
College 12/4/2007 26 N     
Khalid Mohamud 
Abshir    12/12/2007 26 N     
Kamal Said Hassan 
Some 
College 12/6/2007 24 N     
Umar Muhammad 
Jama   12/8/2007   N     
Ahmed Ali Omar 
High 
School 12/8/2007 23 N     
Abdifatah Yusuf Isse 
Some 
College 12/8/2007 25 N     
Salah Osman Ahmed 
Some 








Zakaria Maruf High school 2/1/2008 30 N Y  
Mustafa Ali Salat 
In High 




School 8/1/2008 17 N    
Troy Kastigar 
High 
School 11/3/2008 28 Y    
Jamal Bana In College 11/3/2008 20 N    
Mohamoud Hassan In College 11/4/2008 23 N    










school 11/3/2008 17 N    
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As can be seen from Table 1, the recruitment and departures of the travelers 
occurred in what can be categorized as two waves from 2007 to 2008.  The first set of 
“travelers” left between November and December of 2007.6  In this first wave, the 
travelers had an average age of 24.8 years old.  Only one person had a criminal record, 
Abdifatah Isse, for possession of drugs and writing bad checks (New York Times, 2009).  
Of the first wave travelers, five of the six7 had graduated from high school, and three 
were engaged on and off in some college level work, although none had obtained a higher 
degree (New York Times, 2009).  Of this group, none appeared to be involved in Somali 
youth gangs common among in the Twin Cities community (MLE1, 2009). 
The second wave of the Somali travelers, by contrast, were four years younger 
having an average age of 20.2 years and would have registered an average age lower than 
20 but for the outlier of the group, 28-year old Muslim convert Troy Kastiger.  Except for 
Kastiger, all of the youth were considered to be the “hope of the Somali American 
community” (Ahmed, 2009, p. 3).   
The exception, Troy Kastiger, known as “Abdirahman,” appears to be the 
anomaly of this wave.  Raised by a single mother in Minneapolis, Kastiger was a 28-year 
old convert to Islam and according to his mother was of Native American descent with no 
previous ties to Somalia (Yuen, 2009).  Unlike his fellow second wave travelers, Kastiger 
had several misdemeanor convictions ranging from credit card fraud to driving on a 
revoked license (Yuen, 2009).  With the exception of Kastiger, all of the second wave 
travelers were excelling in school and had no gang ties or criminal histories.    
D. PROFILE #1 SHIRWA AHMED 
In 1996, then 14-year old Shirwa Ahmed left a Kenyan refugee camp for the 
United States.  Ahmed’s mother settled her family in Portland, Oregon and later moved to 
Minneapolis, Minnesota in order to be closer to her extended family.  In 2000, then 18-
                                                 
6 The exact date of departure in many of the cases was unavailable or could not be located by the 
author.  Other departure dates such as Isses’s and Salah Ahmed’s were taken from their criminal 
indictment, others were taken from press reports.  While the exact dates in many cases are not verifiable 
they do present a general range of times, where the exact date is not known but the month is, the first day of 
the month is used. 
7 No educational information was available on Jama. 
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year old Ahmed graduated from Roosevelt High School in Minneapolis, Minnesota.  
Described by his teachers as affable, quiet, and an “average student,” Ahmed had by 
appearances integrated into his hostland as well as any other émigré to the United States 
(New York Times, 2009).  His lifestyle reflected that of any other American teenager, 
memorized rap lyrics from “Ice Cube”, he wore hip-hop fashions, played basketball after 
school and hung out at the Mall of the Americans in Minneapolis competing with friends 
over who could gather the most phone numbers for girls.  According to his friends, 
however, “Shirwa could never do it.  He was too shy” (Meryhew, 2009).  Although by all 
outward appearances Ahmed was integrating into American life, according to friends, he 
was also cognizant of the separation between himself and larger neighborhood 
community, especially among the African-American students who frequently clashed 
with Somalis (see Chapter V).       
Ahmed attended college on and off and took various jobs, including pushing a 
wheelchair at the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport along with other Somali youth.  
Interestingly, half of Ahmed’s income from that job went to pay remittances back to 
distant relatives in Somalia, which placed an enormous strain on a family that lived 
below the poverty line (Elliott, 2009).  During this time, Ahmed attended a local 
community college and hung out with friends.  However, between 2003 and 2004, 
Ahmed began to distance himself from his old friends and acquired a more religious-
minded friend-set (Elliott, 2009).  He began praying at the mosque five times a day, 
attempted to grow a beard, traded in his hip-hop fashions for pants cuffed at the ankle, 
and adopted more conservative Muslim customs, such as not touching women.  Ahmed 
began serving as a counselor to other Somali youth dealing with alcohol and drug 
addiction. Additionally, he would frequently preach to Somali youth outside the mosque 
and encourage friends to pray.   
While friends recount Ahmed reaching out to troubled youth within his 
community, court documents show Ahmed himself being reached out to by jihadist 
recruiters.  Cooperating witnesses detail multiple meetings around the Twin Cities, 
including meetings in private residences and mosques where conspirators discussed the 
jihad in Somalia and the need for the Somali Americans to fight against Ethiopia (United 
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States v. Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax et al., 2009).  In one meeting, a co-conspirator 
located in Somalia explained via telephone, “We need you guys here,” and others 
explained that travelling for “jihad was the best thing that they could do” (Elliott, 2009, p. 
9).    
On December 4, 2007, Ahmed departed the United States as part of the first wave 
of travelers, according to FBI affidavits (United States v. Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax et 
al., 2009).  Ahmed, unlike his fellow travelers, travelled to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in order 
to conduct the hajj pilgrimage before travelling on to Somalia via Yemen (Jane's 
Terrorism and Security Monitor, 2009).  Once in Somalia, Ahmed and his fellow 
travelers trained at an al-Shabaab training camp, which included “dozens” of other young 
ethnic Somalis from elsewhere in African, Europe, and the United States (2009, p. 8).  In 
late October 2008, Ahmed’s sister received a phone call from her brother stating that he 
was in Yemen and would be heading home soon.   
However, instead of returning home on October 29, 2008, Ahmed drove his 
explosives laden Toyota Land Cruiser through the streets of Hargeysa, the capital of 
Somaliland.  As he passed through an intersection, he gunned the SUV, plowing into the 
side of the Ethiopian consulate and detonated the explosives.  At the same time, three 
other vehicles conducted simultaneous attacks in the northern breakaway region of 
Somaliland.  The final death toll included 28 people and 48 wounded (Elliott, 2009).  
Ahmed would later be identified when FBI agents discovered a severed finger at the site, 
which fingerprint analysis linked to Ahmed (United States v. Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax 
et al., 2009). 
E. PROFILE #2 BURHAN HASSAN 
Hassan Burhaan’s mother fled Somalia with him when he was 8 months old.  
They settled in a refugee camp in nearby Kenya and arrived in the United States when 
Burhan was four years old (February 12, 1996).  Burhan was a typical American teenager 
who did well in school, talked about girls, and occasionally borrowed $20 from his mom 
on weekends to see the most recent Hollywood movie (Elliott, 2009).  Burhan was 
described by relatives as “the hope of the Somali American Community.”  He ranked in 
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the top of his class at Roosevelt High School, a high school in the Cedar-Riverview 
neighborhood of Minneapolis.  His straight “A” average was made all the more 
impressive by his enrollment in college level courses, which were sponsored by the 
University of Minnesota to prepare students for careers in medicine (Yuen & Aslanian, 
2009).   
By all accounts, Burhan was the model high school senior.  He was ambitious, 
with plans on applying to Harvard in the spring. He studied Islam at nearby Abu-Bakar 
As-Saddique mosque since 1998, where he also attended the Islamic youth group 
(Ahmed, 2009).  According to his uncle, having no personal memory of Somalia, Burhan 
exhibited little interest in Somali politics or clan issues, either at home or in Minneapolis 
(Ahmed, 2009).  His uncle, Osman Ahmed, further contends that any perceptions of 
Somalia and Burhan’s obligations to his homeland were formed within the walls of the 
As-Saddique mosque (Ahmed,  2009).   
On November 4, 2008, as the country prepared to elect a new president, Hassan 
quietly boarded a Northwest Airlines flight to Kenya.  His mother and his friends did not 
realize that he was missing until that evening when school administrators from Roosevelt 
High School called his mother to inform her that he son had missed all of his classes that 
day (Ahmed, 2009).  Burhan’s mother contacted relatives, who assured her that Burhan 
was probably working with the “get out the vote” project in the Cedar Riverview 
neighborhood and would return that evening (Ahmed, 2009).  When Burhan failed to 
return, his mother entered his room finding his luggage, laptop, clothes, and passport 
gone.  Burhan would not be heard from again until one week later when he called his 
mother and told her simply, “I am fine, I am in Somalia” (Elliott, 2009).   
According to Burhan’s uncle, once his cousin arrived in Somalia, while his mind 
was still trying to reconcile the promised utopia of Somalia with the real Somalia, his 
travel documents and belongings were taken from him by the recruiters (Elliott, 2009).  
Burhan was then whisked away to a hidden military training camp.  Once there, 
instructors stressed to him that if he fled or returned home, he will be tried as a terrorist 
or end up in Guantanamo (Ahmed, 2009). Seven months later, Burhan’s journey came to 
end when he was killed, allegedly by al-Shabaab militatants after he indicated his desire 
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to leave Somalia.  The day Burhan died was, coincidentally, one day short of the day his 
classmates at Roosevelt High graduated.  While Burhan’s tale devastated his family and 
friends, he was not the only Somali-American who has made the trip to their homeland. 
F. PROFILE #3 MOHAMOUD HASSAN 
Born in 1986 in Somalia, Mohamoud Hassan, nicknamed “Snake,” arrived in the 
United States as a young child (Elliott, 2009).  Originally, settling in San Diego, Hassan’s 
family later moved to Minneapolis, where he lived and cared for his grandmother while 
attending Roosevelt High School (Elliott, 2009).  Hassan excelled in high school and was 
voted “most friendly” by his 2006 graduating class (Elliott, 2009).  Hassan surpassed his 
peers academically and, upon graduation, attended the University of Minnesota (Elliott, 
2009).  While at college, Hassan became the vice president of the schools Somali Student 
Union and became interested and passionate about Somali politics (Elliott, 2009).  After 
the 2006, invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia, Hassan published an essay on his Facebook 
page.  The essay, published on May 2, 2007, was in support of the Ethiopian backed 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (Hassan, 2009).  In his essay, Hassan articulates 
how the TFG is the only legitimate authority in the country, and he denounced the 
Islamic insurgents as “a handful of thugs:” 
The reality is that those who oppose the Transitional Federal Government 
have no alternative to offer. They are quite content to see Somalia in the 
same state of chaos and anarchy that it has been in for the last 17 years. 
Yes, they may try to present themselves as the saviors of Somalia but in 
reality they are the destroyers of our nation. Under various disguises and 
multiple aliases they oppose the return of normality and sense of order to 
our country. They want to keep us in a state of nature where those who are 
strong get their way at the expense of those who are weak. (2009) 
However, as stated by Elliott (2009), in the fall of 2007, Hassan began attending 
the Abubaker al-Siddique mosque in Minneapolis.  He began downloading sermons onto 
his IPOD (Elliott, 2009, p. 7).  He also began seeking out jihadists websites and listening 
to the lectures of pro-Al Qaeda cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki (Elliott, 2009, p. 7).  Hassan, 
who a year earlier, was arguing Somali politics and advocating against Islamists in his 
homeland, slowly began to approve of the insurgency and their goals (Elliott, 2009, p. 7).  
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Furthermore, the May 2008, U.S. airstrike that killed Aden Hashi Ayro, a leader of al-
Shabaab, along with 10 civilians outraged Hassan who responded with “how dare they,” 
and “[w]ho is the terrorist?” (Elliott, 2009, p. 7).  While Hassan’s outrage initially 
appeared to be nationalistic in nature it, evolved into a religious calling as he began 
telling his friends that the turmoil in Somalia was punishment from God and that only 
restoring the caliphate would redeem the Somali nation (Elliott, 2009, p. 7).  This new-
found devotion seemed to be formed by a combination of Internet jihadist videos and 
cahtrooms (the preachings of jihadist clerics such as “Constants on the Path to Jihad” by 
Yemeni Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki), and his connection with Zakaria Maruf (Elliott, 2009, 
p. 7).   
Zakaria Maruf, was believed by law enforcement to be a recruiter for al-Shabaab 
in the Twin Cities area prior to his departure to Somalia in February of 2008 (Elliott, 
2009).  Notably, Maruf also was friends with Shirwa Ahmed (Profile 1) and had frequent 
contact with most of the Twin Cities travelers (Elliott, 2009).  If Hassan was the “hope of 
the Somali community,” Maruf, 30, was the failure (Ahmed, 2009; Elliott, 2009).  Upon 
coming to the U.S. as teenager in 1993, Maruf was convicted of some minor crimes prior 
to becoming involved in the violent Somali youth gang, the Hot Boyz (Elliott, 2009).  
Arguably, one of the lost youths of the Somali community, Maruf left the gang and 
committed himself to Islam, including doing the call for prayer and preaching to Somali 
children on street corners (Elliott, 2009, p. 8).  However, with his criminal record, his 
attempts at rehabilitation were limited, and the only employment he could secure was as a 
stockboy at Walmart (Elliott, 2009).  This underemployment further impeded him when 
he attempted to marry, having one family decline his offer to marry their daughter, stating 
that she would “end up on welfare” (Elliott, 2009).  On February 1, 2008, Maruf, 
disappeared from the Minneapolis community and would later resurface in southern 
Somalia (Elliott, 2009). 
After Maruf’s disappearance, Hassan’s fervor increased as he continued to 
communicate with Maruf via conference lines, which were set up by area contacts and 
well attended by Somali youth (Elliott, 2009).  Maruf boasted during these calls about his 
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position with al-Shabaab, and how he was married and important and that he would take 
his listeners “to the battlefield” if they journeyed to the homeland (Elliott, 2009, p. 8). 
According to friends, Hassan was not completely persuaded by Maruf’s pleas 
until he witnessed the shooting death of a close friend outside of the Brian Coyle Youth 
Center in September 2008 (Elliott, 2009, p. 8).  “I used to think that death only happens 
to old people” Hassan was quoted as saying to a friend “but he was young—my age, I 
guess I could die tomorrow” (Elliott, 2009, p. 8).  After this event, Hassan began 
clandestine meetings with University of Minnesota student Abdisalan Ali, 27-year old 
Muslim convert Troy Kastigar, and high school senior Burhan Hassan (Profile #2) 
(Elliott, 2009, p. 8).  In October 2008, the young men visited University Travel Services, 
a travel agent in Cedar Riverview, with an older male escort who informed the agent that 
they wanted to travel to Somalia (Elliott, 2009, p. 8).  The boys returned a week later and 
paid cash for their plane tickets at a cost of $1800 each (Elliott, 2009, p. 8).  On 
November 1, 2008, Hassan drove to Chicago’s O’Hare International and boarded a plane 
for Dubai (Elliott, 2009, p. 8).  
G. COMMON THEMES IN THE TRAVELER’S PROFILES 
What common themes can be gleaned from these three profiles?  Although 
Ahmed’s age at 26 sets him slightly apart from his fellow travelers, all three individuals 
are young, unmarried, and high school graduates at a minimum.  None of the three 
individuals had any documented history of mental illness, or criminal records, and all 
three avoided the problems such as drugs and gangs, which appear to be common to 
many of their peers in the Somali-American Diaspora.   
Only Zakaria Maruf (30), the suspected recruiter, appeared to fall into the “lost 
generation” category of Somali Diasporants in the U.S.  This “lost generation” as 
described by OSP1, is the group of young people who arrive in the U.S. between at the 
age of 15 to 25 (2009).  This generation does not speak English and because of their age 
are either too old to receive a public education or are placed in high school classes in 
which they are educationally ill equipped to perform.  As OSP1 states, they “should be in 
first grade” but are placed in high school, which leads to high drop-out rates (2009).  
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OLE1 observes that most of this generation ends up working in traditionally low skilled 
jobs, such as warehouse workers or driving taxicabs, etc. (2009). 
In contrast to this lost generation, the three profiles above show individuals who, 
in many ways, represented the best and most engaged of the Somali Diaspora.  These 
individuals appeared to have at learned English, progressed successfully through the 
educational system, despite the fact that many of their contemporaries do not, and each 
had either attended college or were destined for college.  The most glowing example of 
this is, Mohamoud Hassan who was a bright, charismatic college student who was deeply 
interested in the politics of a homeland he likely had few memories of.  These very traits 
in any other setting would drive typical college students towards “social movements 
ranging from anti-war movements, environmental causes and anti-globalization, in this 
setting it drove them towards global jihadism” (Aslan, 2006). 
Elements of the crisis of culture discussed in Chapter V can be found in each of 
the profiled individuals. This seems to be more so in the case of Shirwa Ahmed, possibly 
for the sole reason that more information is available about him.  First, despite Ahmed’s 
apparent integration into his hostland, there remained significant ties to his Somali 
identity.  Despite economic hardships at home, Ahmed continued the cultural obligation 
of sending up to half of his take home salary back to Somalia in remittances (Elliott, 
2009).  Other indicators include Ahmed’s struggle between a western identity as an 
African-American youth and his Islamic identity.  His ultimate conversion to a salafist 
identity demonstrated his rejection of the former. 
Similarly, with Mohamoud Hassan, although he appeared to have westernized, he 
continued to feel the pull of his Somali culture.  He idealized Somalia as a utopia and 
maintained the hope of returning there to rebuild his homeland (Elliott, 2009).  Hassan 
further faced the tension between his hostland and his homeland through the actions of 
U.S. backed Ethiopian forces and direct U.S. military involvement against the al-Shabaab 
leadership (Elliott, 2009).   
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VII. RADICALIZATION AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter evaluates how the Somali travelers went from typical diaspora 
members whose culture and background has historically rejected global jihadism to 
becoming jihadist recruits.  The one factor that is universally agreed upon by counter-
terrorism researchers, with respect to how someone radicalizes to global jihadism, is that 
there is no universal profile.  As Marc Sagemen, author of Understanding Terrorist 
Networks, writes, “[t]here’s really no profile, just similar trajectories to join the jihad and 
that most of the men were upwardly and geographically mobile” (Public Broadcasting 
Company, 2007).  This “trajectory,” as Sageman coins it, while containing individual 
nuances caused by environment, situation, or personality, maintains several observable 
commonalities.           
B. PATH TO RADICALIZATION 
The Twin Cities travelers’ path to radicalization can be broken into four phases 
for review: 1) pre-radicalization; 2) adoption of fundamentalism through a “crisis of 
culture;” 3) fundamentalist to jihadism through injustice framing; and 4) action.8  As 
discussed in the literature review, there numerous models to for the radicalization process 
and different researchers place different emphasis on one factor over another.  However, 
for the purposes of this analysis it is less important which model is used and more 
important to compare other instances of radicalization with the Somali travelers to 
determine if any differences exist.     
While not necessarily a stage, most models begin with a review of the pre-
radicalization, or a “before” snapshot of the individual.  Generally, these snapshots are of 
individuals who appear to be well-integrated, second/third generation Muslim émigrés 
with moderate to high educational level and, from outward appearances, have 
                                                 
8 This outline roughly resembles one presented by FBI Official John Miller’s testimony before United 
States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, May 10, 2007, which appears to 
have been taken from NYPD’s Silber and Bhatt study (New York Police Department, 2007).  
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successfully made the integrative journey into their western hostland.  The second phase 
is the adoption of fundamentalist, Wahabbist/Salafi, Islamic practices (defined below).  
This adoption commonly requires the shedding of much of the outward manifestations of 
western culture as well as adopting a “literal interpretation” of Islam (Gartenstein-Ross & 
Grossman, 2009).  The third phase is progression is the conversion from fundamentalist 
to jihadist through the adoption of “injustice framing” requiring the development of an 
“us versus them” belief system.  Finally, through a triggering event or simply through 
group pressure the individual is driven into action (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, April 
2009).   
As a caveat, while numerous individuals begin on this path, the majority do not 
proceed to the final act of terrorism.  While many countries and many more diaspora 
communities practice Wahhabism, the majority never progress down a path of 
radicalization.  Rather, it is important to note that this journey is overwhelmingly taken 
by western diasporants, who start out westernized and appear to be drawn to jihadism as a 
social movement more than a lifelong religious tenant.  As Sageman found in his study, 
the ranks of the Salafi jihadists generally do not include religious scholars and individuals 
with a lifetime of devout religious practice but rather are individuals who seek identity 
through belonging to this larger social movement (2004). 
1. Pre-Radicalization 
The “pre-radicalization” stage represents the “before” snapshot of the individual, 
prior to beginning on his journey towards jihadism.  While this arguably is not a “stage” 
in the radicalization process, it is helpful to evaluate this period because the experiences 
and circumstances during this time will either facilitate or deter the individual’s 
progression down the path of the radicalization process. In the case of the Somali 
Diaspora, this pre-radicalization “context” is what ultimately sets the stage for future 
radicalization.     
The pre-radicalization stage often standouts only for its unremarkable nature.  
This stage is generally marked by members of western Diaspora communities attempting 
to integrate into their western hostlands.  They become involved in the job market; 
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engage, and in many cases excel, in western educational institutions; and socialize to 
varying degrees with their western counterparts.  All of this is generally done without 
acquiring a criminal record, becoming involved in gangs, or even garnering the attention 
of law enforcement (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 6).  All of the individuals appear to marked 
by the enthusiastic adoption of their hostland’s popular culture (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).   
As Silber and Bhatt point out, the commonalities among the five Western-based 
plots that they studied are: male Muslims under the age of 35; second and third 
generation émigrés; educated, at least to high school level; little if any criminal history; 
do not begin as radical or devout and frequently converts to Islam (2009, p. 23).  
Examples of this frequently include individuals such as 22-year old, Shehzad Tanweer, 
the 7/7 Aldgate bomber, who was a second generation British-Pakistani.  His father was 
originally a Yorkshire police officer, later turned entrepreneur who owned several 
businesses, including a fish and chips shop where Shehzad worked part-time (Bennetto, 
2005).  Shezhad excelled in cricket, worked out, pursued a degree in sports medicine, and 
drove a Mercedes sports car (Fattah, 2005).  Other 7/7 bombers include ringleader 
Mohammed Siddique Khan, who during this phase attended university, smoked 
cigarettes, and was called “Sid” by his mixed group of friends (Malik, 2007).   
In a similar way, which indicates little difference between Somalis and other 
Muslim Diasporas, the Twin Cities travelers adopted strikingly similar profiles to their 
European and U.S. counterparts outlined in the Silber & Bhatt study.  For instance, 
Mohamoud Hassan is typical in his adoption of western culture, his embrace of popular 
“hip-hop” language and dress, and his academic achievements at the University of 
Minnesota (Elliott, 2009).        
Similarly, Ahmed memorized rap lyrics, dressed in hip-hop attire, and according 
to his friends would emulate hip-hop gestures and movements, such as telling his friend 
Nicole Hartford, “Watch my swag, Nicole, watch my swag” as he walked away 
(Meryhew, 2009).  He by all accounts had mastered English, was attending college, and 
had successfully integrated into the U.S. 
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Other travelers include the bookish 17-year old traveler, Burhan Hassan who 
maintained an “A” average at Roosevelt High School and spoke frequently about 
attending Harvard (Ahmed, 2009).  Likewise, Jamal Bana and Abdislan Ali, both second 
wave, studied electrical engineering and chemical engineering, respectively, in 
Minneapolis area colleges and appeared destined to live out the American dream (Elliott, 
2009).  
What is notably absent from this “before” snapshot is a strong cultural 
understanding of the Somali homeland or any devout adoption of Islam at this point.  As 
pointed out by Burhan Hassan’s uncle, the young men had no memory of their homeland 
and rather enjoyed an idealized utopian fantasy about Somalia (Ahmed, 2009).  There is 
no indication that any of the youth felt the strong pull of clannism, nor did any of the 
youth appear to be exceptionally devout or religious growing up.   
What can be gleaned from this is that there appears to be little difference between 
the Somali travelers and other radicalized individuals during this phase.  Rather, all 
appeared to be typically well-integrated young adults with no or only minor criminal 
histories and no long standing relationship with fundamentalist Islam. 
2. Adoption of Fundamentalism  
The second phase in the radicalization process is an individual’s exploration and 
adoption of a fundamentalist Salafi identity and the slow migration “away from their 
former identity” (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 30).  Salafi (from Salaf, “ancient ones” or 
“predecessors” in Arabic) is an “emulation, an imitation of the mythical Muslim 
community that existed at the time of Mohammed,” which is considered by Salafis to be 
the sole historical occasion where a fair and just society existed (Sageman, 2004).  This 
fundamentalist practice relies upon a legalistic or literal interpretation of the Koran, 
devoid of modernization and interpretations that may have evolved since the death of the 
Prophet Mohammed, thus, returning to the fundamentals.   
In embracing this legalistic interpretation of the Koran and Salafism, an individual 
adopts a “rules-based” approach to his faith including thought and practice (Gartenstein-
Ross & Grossman, 2009).  According to Gartenstein-Ross, who studied 117 cases of 
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homegrown terrorists, approximately half of the jihadis studied had adopted this “rules-
based” approach on their path to jihadism (2009, p. 36).9   
This adoption of this salafist/legalistic interpretation necessarily requires the 
abandonment of much of the individual’s prior identity, including quitting jobs that are 
inconsistent with Salafi doctrines, such as working in restaurants that serve alcohol 
(Silber & Bhatt, 2007).  Other actions include dropping out of secular educational 
establishments, distancing themselves from non-devout or non-Muslim friends and 
adopting an orthopraxis approach to Islam that adheres strictly to outward signs of 
devotion such as wearing a beard, wearing pants cut short consistent with how the 
Prophet is said to have dressed, and not touching women (Aslan, 2006). 
For instance 7/21 bomber Ramzi Mohammed altered his London lifestyle from 
someone who “drank, went clubbing, and chased girls” to a man who had to quit two 
different jobs so that he did not have to be near alcohol or pork (Gartenstein-Ross & 
Grossman, 2009, p. 39).  In the 2007, Ft. Dix plot, the formerly non-observant Duka 
brothers began “praying differently” and refused to attend a relative’s wedding because 
they would play music at the wedding (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009, p. 37).   
It is worth inquiring, however, as to how a Somali diasporant, whose parents 
practice a form of Sunni Islam that has traditionally rejected fundamentalist Islam, takes 
up the observance of Salafi Islam in the United States.  This is in large part due to the 
proliferation of Gulf State funded or affiliated Muslim institutions within Western states.  
These predominantly Wahhabist/Salafist organizations are far reaching organizations, 
who unlike their traditionalist counterparts, market towards young diasporants.   
While evidence exists for these “tipping points,” other observers suggest that it is 
far more likely that the evolution to Salafi Islam is a slow and gradual development over 
a period of time and that a single event does not ignite the process but rather a series of 
circumstances start the process.  As an example of this, it is interesting to consider 
Mohammed Siddique Khan, the recruiter, organizer, and one of the four perpetrators of 
                                                 
9 It is worth noting that in Gartenstein’s study (2009), 59 individuals showed signs of this trait, while 
only four individuals actually did not adopt this interpretation of Islam.  There was insufficient data on the 
remaining 55 individuals to confirm or refute this trait (Gartenstein, 2009, p. 36). 
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the London 7/7 bombings.  Mohammed was born and raised in the industrial town of 
Beeston, a poor inner suburb of Leeds in Yorkshire, England (Alsan, 2009).  His parents 
and siblings were observant Muslims who attended the traditionalist neighborhood 
mosque (Malik, 2007).  The mosque was a locally funded mosque, which catered to the 
first generation Pakistani population, giving its sermons in Urdu (language of most 
Pakistanis) (Malik, 2007).  The mosques’ older Pakistani clergy rarely engaged with the 
youth of the neighborhood, except to facilitate the rote memorization of the Koran 
(Malik, 2007).  The traditionalist practice at the mosque was not fundamentalist in nature, 
but rather “traditionalist,” which sought to incorporate religious rulings and 
interpretations since the death of the Prophet Mohammed to the present as well as 
Pakistani cultural elements (Rashid, 2002).   
When looking for the “catalyst” for Khan’s journey towards fundamentalist Islam, 
several are proffered.  For instance, the U.K.’s official government account of Sidique’s 
turn to fundamentalist “self-identification” states that “after an incident in a nightclub, 
[Sidique] said that he turned to religion and it changed his life”(Malik, 2007).  One of 
Khan’s friends proffered another catalyst: that Sidique became a fundamentalist after 
witnessing Israeli soldiers forcibly interrogating an elderly Palestinian man at a West 
Bank checkpoint (Alsan, 2009). 
However, Sidique’s brother, when interviewed by a BBC reporter, stated that the 
theory of a catalyst was “bullshit,” rather the shedding of Siddique’s prior identity and 
adoption of Salafi practice was a “gradual change” that occurred over years (Malik, 
2007).  Khan’s brother explained that in his mid-twenties Khan’s family noticed that he 
had become a Wahhabi when he started praying differently, adding an extra hand gesture 
between prostrations at prayer (Malik, 2007).  Khan’s brother speculated that the 
familie’s traditionalist mosque simply “couldn’t connect with the second generation” 
(Malik, 2007).  This connection with Salafism is attributable to the Wahhab marketing 
and the fact that Siddique did not speak Urdu, which limited his accessibility to his 
families mosque.  Conversely, the Wahhab mosque and its more aggressive recruitment 
posture published literature in English making it more accessible to Siddique (Malik, 
2007). 
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While the catalyst of the night club incident theorized by both the U.K. 
government’s account and the witnessing of the Palestinian’s treatment in the West Bank 
according to Aslan may have been factors , they arguably are not the underlying cause of 
this shift in worldviews and drastic change in identity.  Rather, much of the shift towards 
a Salafi identity may occur on a gradual basis and be caused, in large part, by the unique 
second generation experiences of tribal-based émigrés in the diaspora.  This experience 
causes the “cultural crisis,” as discussed in Chapter IV, within these second-generation 
émigrés in both the U.K. Muslim community and the United States Diasporas that in fact 
serves as the “catalyst” for this conversion to Salafi Islam. 
In this way, the Leed’s bombers and the Twin Cities travelers are comparable.  
Their journey to fundamentalism was really a searching for an alternative identity; 
fundamentalism provided a global identity in lieu of one that possibly did not fit.  Just as 
Siddique Khan was unable to find a Muslim identity at his father’s mosque, so too, was 
Shirwa Ahmed unable to find his identity in the African-American hip-hop youth culture. 
In the case of Shirwa Ahmed, the Twin Cities traveler, Ahmed began 
disassociating himself from his less devout friends; he attempted to grow a beard and 
wore pants with high cuffs, discarding his baggie jeans and hip-hop clothes (Meryhew, 
2009).  He also began counseling other Somali youth on returning to their culture and to 
Islam (Elliott, 2009). 
Mohamud Hassan similarly went from being an engaged youth who was voted 
most “friendly” by his religiously diverse Roosevelt High School class to a youth who 
downloaded jihadist sermons on his IPOD (Elliott, 2009). 
In attempting to explain how this process begins, many terrorism experts cite to a 
catalytic event experienced by the individual (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).  These catalytic 
events can include person experiences, such as economic (loss of a job, blocked 
mobility), social (alienation, discrimination, racism), personal (traumatic events), and 
also larger global events (especially those involving Muslims worldwide) (Silber & 
Bhatt, 2007).   
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In looking for tipping points with respect to the Somali travelers, the most 
apparent is the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 and the subsequent occupation.  In 
at least one Somali profile, Mohamud Hassan, this stands out as a possible “tipping 
point.”  Hasssan’s essay in 2007, which chastised Islamists and supported the Ethiopian 
invasion, appears to have changed with U.S. strikes in the country and allegations of war 
crimes by Ethiopian troops on the Somali population (Elliott, 2009).  This appears to be 
consistent however with the Somali community in general.  According to OLE1, at first a 
lot of Somalis thought the “invasion was a positive thing, but after a while, the 
Ethiopian’s didn’t leave and Somalis began thinking maybe they are actually trying to 
take over” (OLE1, 2009).  
3. Fundamentalism to Jihadism—Injustice Framing 
The next stage in the process of radicalization is taking the leap from 
fundamentalism to jihadism (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).  As a transnational social movement, 
global jihadism’s greatest challenge is linking together all the disparate identities of its 
members under a single collective identity (Alsan, 2009, p. 52).  One of the ways to 
create this collective identity and bring together Muslims of different nationalities, ethnic 
backgrounds, and races is through what sociologist William Gamson calls “injustice 
framing” (1992).     
In implementing injustice framing, the group must first “name” the problem by 
identifying a situation that is un-just or in some way injurious (Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat, 
1980).  Next, the group must identify who is to blame for it; propose a solution to it, deal 
with those responsible, and, finally, connect it to a larger narrative that will resonate with 
as many people as possible (Alsan, 2009).   
This “framing” allows for the creation of an “us versus them” mindset, which is 
arguably essential in moving individuals from fundamentalist to jihadist.  This “us versus 
them” schism is highlighted in the Gartenstein-Ross’s study that found only six 
individuals of 117 did not adopt this “West versus Islam” indicator (Gartenstein-Ross & 
Grossman, 2009, p. 27).  Furthermore, of the 117 individuals studied, over 70 percent  
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adopted a political radicalization “schism” view that western states have conspired to 
subjugate Islam and that only military action (jihad) is the proper response (Gartenstein-
Ross & Grossman, 2009, p. 52). 
In creating this “injustice framing,” first there is a requirement that an injustice be 
identified, or “named” (Gamson, 1992).  This “naming” must be more than a cognitive or 
intellectual acknowledgement of what is fair, rather it must be what Gamson calls “’hot 
cognition’, the kind of righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul” 
(1992).  Social scientists generally agree that “anger and indignation” are high activation 
emotions that tend to mobilize individuals, whereas, in contrast, emotions such as shame, 
guilt, or embarrassment are considered low activation emotions, which tend to discourage 
action (Jasper, 1998).   
In the case of the Somali travelers, the “hot cognition” was made up of several 
factors but, in particular, the U.S. backed Ethiopian invasion of Somali in 2006.  Analysts 
point out that the two-year occupation by Ethiopia left Somalis “radically angry, a 
sentiment echoed nationally and abroad with the Somali Diasproa Network accusing the 
TFG and Ethiopians of pursuing a campaign of collective punishment and genocide” 
(Danish Defense Intelligence Service, 2009).  OLE1 observed that some in the Somali 
community adopted the mantra of “[d]eath to Ethiopia and anyone who supports it”, 
making veiled reference to U.S. support of the invasion and the transitional Somali 
government (OLE1, 2009).  As exhibited by second-wave traveler Mahmoud Hassan, 
there is an evolution in views regarding the Ethiopian invasion and U.S. support for that 
invasion amongst the Somali-American Diaspora (Elliott, 2009).  At least in Mahmoud’s 
case, the allegation of rape of Somali women by Ethiopian forces and the U.S. strikes on 
the insurgency served as another “hot cognition” (Elliott, 2009). 
Next, once an injustice is named, a target must be identified and blamed for the 
wrong (Gamson, 1992). This identification gives the framework a level of concreteness 
necessary to mobilize action.  Otherwise, if an individual sees suffering but only abstract 
or intangible forces they are more likely to accept this status quo, i.e., in the case of 
earthquakes, drought, etc.  In this case of Somalia, jihadist are presented with an almost  
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picture perfect antagonist in a predominantly Christian Ethiopia army.  Furthermore, the 
fact that the current U.S. supported government actually invited the Ethiopians into 
Somali makes this “naming” process relatively easy.   
As pointed out by Gamson, once an individual “names” the cause of the wrong, 
he must be able to expand the identity of the antagonist until he can have the wrong 
resonate with the individuals through his own personal experience (Gamson, 1992).  This 
is done in the case of the Somali travelers by taking a semi-local issue, i.e., Ethiopian 
troops on the ground in Somalia and expanding it out.  For example, first, Ethiopian 
troops were invited into Somalia by the Transitional Federal Government, backed by the 
United States.  Second, Ethiopia is a predominantly Christian state, whose activities are 
supported by the U.S., also a Christian state.  Therefore, Christians are waging a war 
against Islam.   
In many cases, it appears that personal experience of many Somali youth may 
have bolstered the “us-versus-them” narrative.  As pointed out by MLE1, within the 
Somali Diaspora community the memory of post-9/11 round-ups of Muslims by federal 
law enforcement remains a vivid memory, and most “Somalis know someone who was 
picked up during this period” (MLE1, 2009).  Although relatively isolated, these round-
ups have been duplicated somewhat, according to MLE1, in the federal law enforcement 
response to the “travelers,” which has included federal law enforcement pulling Somali 
college students out of their classes to question them (MLE1, 2009).  These actions are 
seen by the Somali community, at least in the Twin Cities, as an attack on the community 
and particularly hurtful when targeting the “best and brightest” of their diaspora (MLE1, 
2009).  Furthermore, as an honor culture, this targeting of the most vulnerable of the 
community, i.e., young women may be a useful narrative.   
As another example, second wave traveler Abdisalan Ali, a chemical engineering 
student, one night in 2008, after meeting with his mentor to discuss his upcoming 
MCATs, was wrongly accused of robbing a Subway sandwich shop (Elliott, 2009).  
According to interviews with his friends, this experience greatly altered his worldview, 
even after the charges were dropped (Elliott, 2009).    
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These factors, along with the ability to build a strong cohesive group dynamic, are 
critical in traversing the gap from fundamentalist to jihadist.  In the case of the Twin 
Cities travelers, the fact that the groups were formed and departed in waves is indicative 
of the fact that they coalesced as a group, which creates pressure on members to continue 
on the path to jihadism. 
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This thesis set out to determine if the cultural and religious traits of Somali 
émigrés in the United States Diaspora would somehow affect the established “trajectory” 
for radicalization that has been observed in other western diaspora groups.  The answer is 
yes and no.  It appears supportable that first generation Somali émigrés are not 
particularly susceptible to radicalization.  Rather, as pointed out in this thesis, the historic 
clan identity, pragmatic religious practices, pastoralism, and nationalism of Somalis, both 
in at home and in the diaspora, generally discourages the adoption of transnational 
movements such as global jihadism.   
However, as has been shown by the profiles of the Somali travelers, these young 
adults are less like their parents and more like their American and European counterparts.  
In this way, they are more of a “blank slate” as much of their parent’s clan and cultural 
traits are erased or otherwise altered in the process of integration.  At the same time that 
these youth rush to embrace American culture, they are torn between two cultures, which 
are diametrically opposed to one another.  This tension arguably leaves these youth in a 
gap from which Salafi Islam offers a ready-made rescue.   
A. OUTREACH EFFORTS—GRASSROOTS AND GLOBAL 
Many western states that have experienced homegrown radicalization have also 
attempted to develop programs intended to suppress the appeal of jihadism to its 
populace.  Universally, western states have acknowledged the difficulty in addressing this 
moving target as individuals adopt radical Islam in different manners and at varying rates.  
In the United States, counter-radicalization efforts at the national level have been 
sparse.  The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) and the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), while acknowledging the threat of homegrown 
radicalization within the United States borders does not provide a tangible plan of action 
or measurements of success for staving off the radicalization process domestically 
(Homeland Security Council, 2007; White House, 2006).  This lack of a clear national 
framework is clearly not for lack of a desire to do so.  As DHS Secretary, Janet 
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Napalitano outlined in her testimony before Congress in September 2009, one of the 
primary goals for DHS is to impede the radicalization process through increased 
communications, fostering trust between DHS and Muslim communities, and fostering 
resilient communities that can better resist the radical message (Napalitano, 2009).  While 
DHS has taken several steps towards counter-radicalization, such as outreach meetings 
with community leaders and studying the radicalization process, there remain several 
significant impediments to a more comprehensive counter-radicalization program, such 
as those found in some European countries (e.g., the United Kingdom). 
This chapter will be broken into two sections.  The first section will examine 
briefly the United Kingdom’s CONTEST counter-radicalization program and what 
aspects of it can be applied to the United States.  The second section will provide the 
general observations about outreach by three state/local officials who work within the 
Somali community.  Particularly, these interviewees discuss the issue of conducting 
outreach without making the community feel “under siege” and discuss the impact of 
gangs on radicalization. 
1. The United Kingdom’s CONTEST Program 
The United Kingdom’s CONTEST program may be one of the most useful 
frameworks to analyze outreach and counter-radicalization programs in the U.S. context.  
This is not to say that CONTEST is effective, in fact, the efficacy of the program is 
disputed among British officials and critics alike; however, the factors that the program 
establishes is useful in examining the limits of their application to the United States.  
Updated in 2009, CONTEST is an overall counter-terrorism program whose primary 
objectives are: prevent, pursue, project and prepare (Her Majesty’s [HM] Government, 
2009).  For the purposes of this analysis, the objective of “prevent,” which is aimed at 
stopping terrorist before they become terrorists, will be looked. 
The “prevent” portion of CONTEST is a strategy designed to accomplish five 
main objectives: challenging extremist ideology while supporting mainstream voices; 
disrupting the promotion of extremism; supporting individuals who are vulnerable to 
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recruitment; increasing resiliency of communities against extremism; and addressing the 
grievances that extremists are exploiting (HM Government, 2009, p. 80).   
Countering radical ideology and disrupting the freedom of the messenger to 
deliver his terrorist narrative are two of the primary factors of the U.K.’s “prevent” 
program.  In the UK’s program, this factor relies on the government’s ability to promote 
more moderate voices over those of extremists and ensuring that extremist viewpoints are 
challenged both in content and delivery.  The British version places a large emphasis on 
radicalization on the Internet (HM Government, 2008, p. 4).  While the importance of this 
factor is clear, in discouraging the radical narrative and encouraging moderate voices, the 
United States is faced with several barriers in implementing this program in the 
homeland.   
First, curtailing the Salafi message through government action has significant 
Constitutional impediments.  Primarily, those of the First Amendment’s protection of free 
speech, and the restriction on the government’s endorsement of one religious viewpoint 
over another.  As provided by the First Amendment: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
[emphasis added] or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and petition the Government for a redress of grievances. (United 
States Constitution, 1791) 
The first prohibition restricts the U.S. government and state governments, via the 
Fourteenth Amendment, from promoting religious institutions while the second ensures 
that only specific “non-protected” speech can be curtailed by the government.   
On the issue of unprotected speech, only in limited instances can speech be 
curtailed within the American judicial system.  Courts have generally accepted some 
limitations on the time/place of speech, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes stating “[t]he 
most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire 
in a theatre and causing a panic” (Schneck v. Ohio, 1869).  However, the restriction of 
speech based solely on its content has been hotly disputed within American 
jurisprudence.       
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For the purposes of quelling jihadist recruitment speech, the government is faced 
with two competing legal doctrines, namely the Constitutional interest in allowing 
individuals to freely express their views even if in opposition to the government and the 
equivalency of aiding or inciting someone into the commission of a crime.  As the Court 
in Noto v. United States explained “the mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety 
or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence is not the same as preparing a 
group for violent action and steeling it to such action” (1961).  This difference between 
abstract teaching of jihad and “preparing a group for action” is a narrow line within 
American jurisprudence and restricts the wholesale prohibition of the radical message.   
The seminal case in this area is Brandenburg v. Ohio, in which the Court lays out 
the prevailing test for First Amendment speech.  In that case, the leader of the Ohio 
chapter of the Ku Klux Klan gave two speeches to news reporters advocating the agenda 
of the Klan in establishing white rights in Ohio and making advocating the return of Jews 
and Blacks to Israel and Africa (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 1969).  Once the footage was 
aired, the Klan organizer was subsequently convicted under the Ohio Criminal 
Syndicalism statute, which prohibited the advocation of criminal/violent action for 
accomplishing industrial or political reform.  The Supreme Court struck down the Ohio 
law as unconstitutional because the state may not prohibit “advocacy of the use of force 
or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action” (Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 1969).  The test arising from this case is that advocacy will only be punishable by 
law where the defendant: (1) expressly advocates law violation; (2) calls for immediate 
law violation; and (3) immediate lawless action is likely to occur (Tanenbaum, 2006).   
In analyzing whether the Brandenburg test is satisfied with respect to jihadist 
recruiters, the viability of curtailing this speech remains very fact specific and largely 
unsettled.  For instance, in the case of Ali al-Tamimi, the spiritual guide for the Virginia 
“Paintball Jihad,” al-Tamimi’s activities fell squarely within this speech/encouragement 
category (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).  Al-Tamimi’s clandestine meetings and instructions to 
his students to travel to Afghanistan to fight in the jihad was “speech” but does not 
appear to be speech that is protected for First Amendment purposes (United States v. 
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Khan, 2004).  As argued by Tannenbaum, al-Timimi’s encouragement and instructions to 
his followers expressly advocated a violation of law, and probably satisfied the 
imminence test even though the actual violation of law could have occurred several 
weeks later (Tanenbaum, 2006).  Furthermore, the imminence requirement is in place in 
large part because speech that leads to imminent violence or action does not have the 
opportunity to be contested in the “market place” of ideas.  Similarly, speech made in 
clandestine settings also does not have the opportunity to compete in this “marketplace.”    
Despite this, however, the ability of law enforcement to silence radical and violent 
ideas within these communities continues to be a difficult proposition.  Rather, it appears 
that the individuals best situated to silence these jihadist voices in the community are in 
the community itself.  Much of the contribution that the government can make in helping 
these communities police themselves against jihadist recruitment is done through 
appropriate outreach.  This would also include the remaining factors of the U.K. program, 
in particular, building resilient communities, addressing grievances exploited by 
terrorists, and identifying at risk youth. 
Also, it can at least be argued that outreach to more fundamentalist and salafist 
groups within the U.S. homeland should be considered.  While these groups frequently 
espouse ideas contrary to American values, they also could become allies in curbing 
radicalism within their communities since actions by rogue members of their networks 
brings undesirable consequences for the greater community.  This type of outreach has 
historical successes as pointed out by Joseph McCann, in his study of anarchist in the 
United States during the industrial revolution (2006).  In the case of the anarchists, these 
organizations would frequently work with law enforcement in providing information on 
rogue members whose violent ambitions threatened the broader goals of the larger 
movement (McCann, 2006). 
The interviews conducted on the issue of outreach within both the Minneapolis 
and Columbus communities identified the need for local and consistent grassroots 
outreach, in lieu of an isolated and macro approach.  In particular, the interviewees 
identified the need to conduct a more holistic outreach that relies heavily on individual 
trust and relationships. 
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For instance, OSP1 observed that efforts to go into the Somali community and 
state, “We are interested in talking to you about radicalization” are generally ineffective 
(OSP1, 2009).  Rather, a more successful approach has been “inviting” the community to 
not only be “a part of counter-terrorism efforts but also a part of the larger community” 
(OSP1, 2009).  This can be accomplished by not only conducting outreach regarding 
terrorism but through involvement in the community regarding health issues, social 
services issues, and questions regarding immigration (OSP1, 2009).  OSP1 explained that 
working to help Somalis on problems unrelated to terrorism builds trust and the personal 
capital needed when soliciting cooperation with sensitive issues such as radicalization 
(OSP1, 2009). 
Echoing this was MLE1, who identified the need for a community-policing model 
to address the community and its challenges early on, instead of coming in after a 
terrorism incident had occurred (2009).  MLE1 explained that frequently the local police 
have a better opportunity to work in the Somali community than their federal 
counterparts for several reasons (2009).  First, federal law enforcement is generally not 
trusted by the Somali community (MLE1, 2009).  In particular, the FBI is frequently 
resented in the community for the large post 9/11 roundup of Muslim-Americans and for 
the interviewing of Somali college students in Minneapolis, in particular for pulling these 
students out of classes (MLE1, 2009).  While the true numbers of these interviews are 
probably quite small, this action has taken on an urban legend permanency within the 
community that continues to impede broader outreach (MLE1, 2009). 
When asked how government officials make inroads into these communities if 
they do not have established roots, MLE1 acknowledged the disadvantage to this 
approach and simply stated that being upfront is the only way (2009).  Also, working in 
partnership with the community and sharing information instead of simply asking for it is 
an approach that is consistent with the Somali culture.  Yaa warkii bi’in oo war haya 
(Whoever could give us information, be blessed), is a Somali saying that emphasizes the 
importance of exchanging information during interactions (Issa-Salwe & Olden, 2008, p. 
574).  As an oral culture, Somalis place a premium on a person’s ability to accurately 
relay information, or wargalnimo in Somali (Issa-Salwe & Olden, 2008, p. 575).  A 
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failure to properly handle information causes a loss of face in the culture and an 
individual can become gabadhaa guurwaa (he whose daughter would not be married) 
(Issa-Salwe & Olden, 2008).  MLE1 explained lessons learned from this oral tradition in 
hanging informational flyers in the lobby of a high-rise building in the Twin Cities.  
MLE1 explained that only one or two people would stop to read it; however, if simply 
one person was told the news, it would spread through a much larger portion of the 
community (2009).  MLE1 observed that this “grapevine” was significantly more 
accurate than would normally be expected.  This is probably attributable to the 
wargalnimo responsibility mentioned above (2009).  
Another issue that was discussed by both Columbus and Minneapolis/St. Paul 
interviewees was the issue of clans and the importance of keeping perspective on this 
cultural feature.  Both law enforcement officers agreed that it is possible to over 
emphasize the importance of clans when looking at recruitment and radicalization within 
this diaspora community (MLE1, 2009; OLE1, 2009).  OLE1 further pointed out that 
initially several law enforcement entities maintained a myopic focus on clans in both 
terms of recruitment and in terms of information sources, only to discard these clan 
distinctions later on (2009). 
All interviewees did agree; however, that clans continue to play a role in diaspora 
life and issues, such as obtaining interpreters and organizing outreach events must 
include a consideration of clan affiliation.  Comments regarding this topic included the 
need to use several different interpreters from various clans in order to ensure a balanced 
accounting of conversations (MLE1, 2009) and ensuring that invitations to outreach are 
not through a single “community leader,” which often will result in members of only one 
clan receiving invitations (OLE1, 2009).  As stated previously in this thesis, however, an 
overall acknowledgement that many Somalis, especially Somali youth, are drawn more 
towards a nationalistic and religious identity than a clan-based identity.  
The issue of gangs was brought up by all those interviewed, each assigning 
varying degrees of importance to the problem.  Interviewees almost unanimously 
identified Somali youth gangs as a serious issue to both the Somali Diaspora and the 
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associated communities they reside in.  However, the significance of gangs as platforms 
for recruitment to jihadist Islam was downplayed by interviewees.   
Gangs in both the Minneapolis/St. Paul and Columbus community appear to have 
begun as a defense mechanism to protect its members from harassment or assault by non-
Somalis (OLE1, 2009).  However, the Somali gangs have evolved into a criminal 
enterprise including significant revenue generating activities such as drug distribution and 
prostitution (MLE1, 2009).  As to whether these gangs represented a threat of terrorism, 
one interviewee replied that the gangs could be a “good or bad thing for [jihadist] 
recruitment” (OLE1, 2009).  On the one hand, according to OLE1, the violence 
normalized by street gangs in their members in achieving objectives could be redirected 
by a savvy recruiter towards jihadism (OLE1, 2009).  As put by self-proclaimed U.K. al-
Qaeda recruiter turned anti-terrorist advocate, “unlike the traditionalists, the network 
(jihadist) won’t judge a potential recruit on his actions. ”If the network see a drug dealer 
or someone from a gang, they will not condemn him like the traditionalists and say ‘oh 
brother haram, haram [forbidden].’ What they’ll try to do is to utilise his energy” (Malik, 
2007).  OLE1 pointed out the recruitment rhetoric directed at the Somali-Diaspora youth 
in the U.S. frequently includes chastisements such as “you’ve lost your character, you’ve 
abandoned your culture, your people, your values and your religion” and then attempts to 
convince the youth that their efforts could more honorably be directed towards the global 
jihadism (2009).  At least one of the Twin Cities travelers appears to have been subject to 
his return to his people mantra.  Zakaria Maruf, for instance, went from violent street 
gang member to devout jihadist (Elliott, 2009).   
One of the unintended consequences of the community keeping their children 
away from street gangs may be that they push these young people into the hands of 
jihadist recruiters.  OLE1 asserted that one of the unintended consequences of avoiding 
gangs may push youth into the hands of jihadist recruiters (2009).  This occurs where a 
family’s fear about their sons joining gangs causes them to push children towards the 
mosque where a jihadist recruiter may be waiting for them (OLE1, 2009).  A case in 
point may be that of Burhan Hassan, who died in Somalia in 2008.  According to his 
uncle, Osman Ahmed, Burhan grew up studying at the Abu-Bakar As-Saddique mosque 
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where he attended their youth group (2009, p. 3).  Burhan’s uncle indicates how the 
family was relieved by his affiliation with the mosque because it meant he had not joined 
the gangs that are so prevalent in the community (Ahmed, 2009).  According to Ahmed, 
who appears to place the fault for his nephew’s radicalization squarely on the mosque, 
the children attending the mosque “had no perception of Somalia except the one that was 
formed in their mind by their teachers at the Abu-Bakar Center” (2009, p. 3).   
However, none of the interviewees believed a firm link existed between the street 
gangs and radicalization (MLE1, 2009).  Rather, MLE1 observed that the individuals 
who join fall into jihadist groups are higher-minded and appear to operate off of “higher 
ideals” than their gangland counterparts (MLE1, 2009).  Conversely, MLE1 observed that 
Minnesota gangs, which are often divided along Somali clan lines, were interested in 
what “what gangs are interested in,” namely “making money and living the gangster 
lifestyle” (2009). 
As a result, this research suggests that an over-emphasis on gangs could be a 
mistake and waste of resources for homeland security purposes.  While undoubtedly the 
current integration issues within the Somali-American community means that gangs will 
continue to be a problem in the short-term.  This also means that the recruitment efforts 
by the gangs will continue to be extensive within the Somali community. However, it is 
unclear whether this will be anything other than a domestic criminal issue.  Further 
research is justified into the link between Somali gangs and insurgency funding as these 
gangs continue to maintain strong clan ties with the homeland and continue to support the 
importation of khat, which could be used to finance terrorism.  
The importance of not over-focusing on Somali Diasporants is critical.  Although 
law enforcement is now engaged, the problem of the travelers should be kept in 
perspective.  An eye towards world events must be incorporated into the community 
policing that occurs in this diaspora community.  As seen throughout this thesis, 
understanding the context of immigrant groups as well as how world events can drive 
local events is critical in countering radicalization.  The events in Somalia directly relate 
to the events in these two communities and should be monitored with that in mind.  Just 
as the Ethiopian invasion drove much of the nationalistic and religious fervor over the 
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Ethiopian invasion should also be alleviated by the subsequent withdraw.  This lack of a 
non-Muslim enemy may mean that Islamism will return to its historically subordinate 
position within the pragmatic Somali society.  As a result, it is imperative that 
governments monitor these world events with an eye towards how they may affect the 
climate of their diaspora communities.   
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APPENDIX INTERVIEWS 
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